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Economy and is reprinted here with permission from Elsevier. The fourth essay has been 
published in FinanzArchiv and is reprinted here with permission from Mohr Siebeck.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Summary 
1
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1.1. Introduction 
Decentralization of the public sector is often promoted, by for instance the World Bank and 
the IMF, as an institution that can help solve control problems and rigidities in public sector 
provision and stimulate efficient provision. But as Oates (1999) points out – the proper goal 
of restructuring the public sector cannot be simply decentralization. This thesis addresses the 
major incentive mechanism of decentralized government – fiscal competition. Fiscal 
competition theory deals with how fiscal policymaking is affected by competitive pressures 
faced by governments (Wildasin, 2006).1 Competition among governments has the potential 
to work as a disciplining device because it ensures that no jurisdiction is allowed to be grossly 
inefficient, because if it were grossly inefficient, mobile factors of production would move 
away. A related mechanism is yardstick competition. Rather than governments being linked 
through their treasuries, yardstick competition links them through the informal content of each 
jurisdiction’s fiscal policies. In particular, policies chosen in a given jurisdiction and those in 
similar jurisdictions enables citizens in the former jurisdiction to comparatively evaluate the 
performance of government officials and vote accordingly. In the following I define fiscal 
competition broadly to include both classes of strategic interaction models.   
While competition among companies tends to be beneficial for the general public, this is not 
necessarily the case for competition among governments. Key in the fiscal competition theory 
is that the mobility of firms and households yields incentives for governments to aim to 
improve their relative position through successive undercutting of tax rates and welfare state 
arrangements. The main concern in the theoretical fiscal competition literature has been that 
fiscal competition lowers government spending below their efficient levels. 2, 3 This concern is 
warranted if public expenditures are used by benevolent politicians to provide public services 
1 Closely related to the fiscal competition literature is the seminal Tiebout (1956) contribution. Tiebout 
conjectured that, analogous to free market competition, could competition among publicly elected governments 
for mobile households yield an efficient provision of local public goods. The key idea is that people with high 
demands for public services would be drawn to localities with high levels of public good provision, while people 
with low demands for public services would sort themselves to localities with low taxation and low spending.  
2 Fiscal competition may not only lead to inefficient levels of aggregate public expenditures, but also to 
systematic inefficiencies in the composition of public expenditures (Keen and Marchand, 1997). 
3 One of the early statements concerning this mechanism is found in Oates (1972, p. 143): “The result of tax 
competition may well be a tendency toward less than efficient levels of output of local services. In an attempt to 
keep taxes low to attract business investment, local officials may hold spending below those levels for which 
marginal benefits equal marginal costs, particularly for those programs that do not offer direct benefits to local 
business.” Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) modeled how this could occur. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
Tiebout (1956) model where factor mobility ensures a Pareto-efficient outcome. The discrepancy is driven by the 
assumption in the Tiebout model that the government can charge a head tax (while only a source based tax is 
available in the Zodrow Mieszkowski model).  
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valued by the citizens. However, if politicians are self serving and use government revenues 
inefficiently, then factor mobility, by limiting public expenditures, also limits waste (the 
argument of Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). Another concern related to fiscal competition is 
that the mobility of resources is likely to undermine attempts by governments to redistribute 
income (Stigler, 1957). It follows that the normative implications of fiscal competition are not 
straight forward. Empirical evaluation of both the existence and consequences of fiscal 
competition is the central topic of this thesis. A particular focus is on fiscal competition in 
welfare policy. 
1.2. Fiscal Competition: Empirical Approaches 
Two key empirical approaches are applied to study fiscal competition among governments. 
The first approach follows a strand of literature initiated by Case et al. (1993) that focus on 
estimating fiscal reaction functions. To identify fiscal competition among governments, a 
reduced form equation is estimated where the policy variable in one jurisdiction (e.g. taxes) is 
related to a weighted average of nearby (typically contiguous) jurisdictions’ policy variables. 
A slope coefficient in the fiscal reaction function different from zero is taken as evidence in 
favor of fiscal competition. Two of the essays in this thesis, which both are joint work with 
Jørn Rattsø, depart from the Case et al. (1993) approach in that the main focus is on fiscal 
reaction functions. Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 evaluate strategic interaction in welfare benefits 
and residential property taxation in Norway, respectively. The results confirm our theoretical 
priors: Strategic interaction among local governments occurs in both welfare and tax policies.  
A possible interpretation of why local governments react strategically to other local 
governments welfare policy, is that they fear becoming a ‘welfare magnet’ if they are too 
generous compared to their peers. Encouraged by the findings in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 deals 
explicitly with the ‘welfare migration hypothesis’, aiming to answer the question: Does 
welfare policy affect residential choices? The main contribution of the analysis is to utilize a 
natural experiment to address the potential policy endogeneity. The econometric analysis 
shows that welfare migration does seem to occur and that this phenomenon is likely to 
contribute (at least partially) to the strategic interaction in welfare policy established in 
Chapter 2.  
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The second main approach applied to evaluate fiscal competition is based on Oates’ (1985) 
seminal contribution on the association between government size and fiscal decentralization. 
Chapter 5 follows in this tradition and analyzes panel data on 18 OECD countries. Across 
these countries (but also within countries over time) the extent of fiscal decentralization 
differs substantially. Since jurisdictions with limited geographic scope (such as local 
governments) are, in general, more likely to face greater competitive pressures than larger 
ones (such as countries), it follows that the more fiscally decentralized countries are expected 
to experience stronger fiscal competition. The contribution of Chapter 5 is to add an improved 
measure of fiscal decentralization and to evaluate not only the size of government, but also 
the composition of government. I argue that how fiscal decentralization affects the 
composition of government can shed some light on the normative and ideological issues 
related to whether fiscal competition is good or ill. A brief summary of all four analyses is 
given below.  
1.3. Summary of the Essays 
Chapter 2: Welfare Competition in Norway: Norms and Expenditures 
Suppose that a Norwegian local government adopts a welfare policy designed to achieve a 
significantly more egalitarian income distribution than exist in neighboring local 
governments. With mobile households this induces Tiebout sorting. Poor people would move 
into the generous jurisdictions, while rich people would move in the opposite direction. At the 
central level this problem does not occur since mobility is reduced, the larger the jurisdictions. 
Based on such reasoning Stigler (1957) concludes that ‘redistribution is intrinsically a 
national policy’. Nonetheless have many countries, such as Norway, decentralized 
responsibility for welfare policy to take advantage of local administration and knowledge. 
Theoretical considerations thus suggests that local governments will choose benefit levels in a 
strategic fashion taking into account of the mobility of the poor and the choices of other 
jurisdictions. Whether such welfare competition is important in practice is an empirical issue 
which is addressed in this essay. Our contribution is to separate between the welfare benefit 
norms decided at the political level and the actual welfare benefit payments of a standardized 
person. Utilizing spatial econometric methods we find statistical significant and similar 
strategic interaction among local governments for both politicians (norm) and bureaucrats 
(actual benefits). 
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Chapter 3: Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment 
Although the analysis in Chapter 2 finds strong strategic interaction in welfare policy, an 
interjurisdictional interaction function is not by itself able to discriminate among competing 
theories of strategic interaction (Revelli, 2005). An observed spatial pattern in welfare 
benefits can stem from different sources: First, because politicians take into account (actual or 
perceived) migration responses from welfare recipients to avoid becoming ‘welfare magnets’. 
Second, because imperfectly informed voters make use of information about political choices 
in close by governments (yardstick competition). Third, a spatial pattern may simply be 
caused by unobserved spatially correlated shocks or omission of a relevant variable which is 
correlated across space. To shed some light on this issue Chapter 3 evaluates actual welfare 
migration in Norway. This essay follows the empirical literature on welfare migration and 
evaluate whether generous governments attract and retain welfare recipients. The main 
contribution is to utilize a centrally implemented policy reform as a natural experiment. More 
specifically I utilize exogenous variation in changes in welfare benefits across Norwegian 
local governments provided by the announcement of national instructive guidelines. The 
econometric analysis finds results consistent with the welfare migration hypothesis only when 
the policy endogeneity is properly addressed. The bias due to policy endogeneity and the size 
of the welfare migration effects suggests that policymakers worry about ‘welfare magnetism’. 
It follows that the spatial pattern found in Chapter 2 is likely to be driven (at least partially) by 
this concern. 
Chapter 4: Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway
Recent theoretical contributions by Glaeser (1996) and Hoxby (1999) suggest favorable 
incentive effects of residential property taxation. Glaeser (1996) compares the effectiveness of 
a property tax in providing a link between the budget available to local officials and their 
choices of public good provision. When housing demand is inelastic property taxation reduces 
waste compared to lump sum taxation because the bureaucrats take into account the feedback 
via increased property values. Hoxby (1999) argues that this link can also improve official’s 
effort, making public production more efficient. The Norwegian setting is very well suited to 
empirically testing the hypothesis that residential property taxation improves public sector 
performance because we can compare similar local governments with and without property 
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taxation. Fiva and Rønning (2006) utilize a well suited data set from the educational sector in 
Norway and find evidence in favor of the hypothesis put forward by Glaeser (1996) and 
Hoxby (1999). Chapter 4 addresses whether political control problems influence the choice of 
having property taxation. When property taxation can help control government officials, 
property taxation will be more desired the larger the imperfections of the system. We focus on 
one of the main sources of political inefficiency, namely political fragmentation (Roubini and 
Sachs, 1989). In addition we evaluate whether the choice of property taxation is influenced by 
yardstick competition. The results show that both mechanisms are relevant. Yardstick 
competition generates a distinct geographic pattern and political fragmentation seems to 
motivate property taxation to control common pool problems.  
Chapter 5: New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and 
Composition of Government Spending 
Chapter 5 argues that one way of addressing the normative issues related to fiscal competition 
is to look into the composition of government spending. In particular you would expect 
government spending which is redistributive in nature to be highly affected by fiscal 
competition, even in the absence of inefficient government (Musgrave, 1959, Stigler, 1957).
Chapter 5 also addresses the precise institutional incentives created by different forms of 
decentralization. Most importantly, if decentralization is to have a constraining effect on the 
size of government, it must occur on both the expenditure and revenue side of the budget. 
This is related to a major issue in the more recent fiscal federalism literature known as vertical 
fiscal imbalance. Sub-central governments that operate under the expectation that their fiscal 
deficits will be bailed out by the central government need not “keep their fiscal houses in 
order” (Oates, 2006). The final contribution of this essay is to utilize an improved measure of 
fiscal decentralization. This data set distinguishes between different kinds of sub-central 
government revenue according to the degree of discretion sub-central governments have on 
determining them autonomously. Interestingly the analysis shows that ‘transfer spending’ and 
‘government consumption’ seem to be differently affected by fiscal decentralization. 
Decentralization of taxing powers is associated with less transfer spending, but unrelated to 
government consumption. Decentralization of spending powers is associated with increased 
government consumption, but unrelated to transfer spending.  
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1.4. Discussion and Future Research Agendas  
A general worry with spatial interaction models in general, and Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 in 
specific, is that the spatial pattern observed is not driven by interaction, but simply ‘reflection’ 
(Manski, 1993). The main threat for obtaining valid estimates is that the neighbors’ control 
variables, which typically are used as instruments, have a direct impact on the policy chosen 
in the jurisdiction considered. If this is the case, they are invalid as instruments and should be 
included in the second stage regression, rather than in the first stage regression.4 A key 
challenge for future research is to investigate closer whether this is a relevant critique. I 
believe three different strategies are likely to prove useful in separating ‘interaction’ from 
‘reflection’ in future research. The first and most obvious solution to this problem is to apply 
other instrumental variables. Ideal instrumental variables provide exogenous variation in 
neighboring jurisdictions policy variables that are clearly identified and understood. Dahlberg 
and Edmark (2004) pursue such a strategy studying strategic interaction in welfare benefits in 
Sweden in a similar fashion to Chapter 2. They take advantage of what they argue is an 
exogenous placement of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) across Swedish 
municipalities. Utilizing this natural experiment they find similar strategic interaction effects 
as when they apply neighboring characteristics as instruments. Although it is comforting that 
the identification strategies relying on neighboring jurisdictions’ characteristics do not seem 
to give rise to biased results, further research along the lines of Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) 
is warranted to establish whether it is reasonable to treat neighbor’s control variables as valid 
instruments.5 A second approach is to rely on auxiliary predictions derived directly from 
fiscal competition theory. For example, it is possible to shed some light on whether the spatial 
pattern in welfare benefits found in Chapter 2 is actually driven by a fear of becoming 
‘welfare magnets’ by testing whether ‘welfare migration’ is in fact taking place (the strategy 
followed in Chapter 3). Another example is the estimation of ‘popularity equations’ in 
yardstick competition models (e.g. Besley and Case, 1995). A final approach would be to 
introduce some interaction terms into the spatial regression, where indirect predictions from 
theories of fiscal competition can distinguish ‘interaction’ from ‘reflection’. Several studies 
4 With more instruments than endogenous variables, it is possible to test the validity of the instruments with an 
overidentifying restrictions test. Although the overidentifying restrictions test does provide some information on 
the validity of the instruments, it is widely acknowledged that it has low power in certain settings (see e.g. 
Newey, 1985).  
5 Note that specification tests for spatial autocorrelation proposed by Anselin et al. (1996) may also prove helpful 
in distinguishing spatial lag dependence from spatial error dependence and consequently ‘interaction’ from 
‘reflection’.  
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have for example included interaction terms consisting of the spatially lagged dependent 
variable and variables describing the electoral process (term limits, electoral margins and 
dummies for election year) to separate yardstick competition from tax base competition. 
These models can also be estimated with Maximum Likelihood methods.  
Another challenging and unresolved issue related to the fiscal competition literature is the 
associated welfare consequences. On one side of the debate are economists who argue that 
fiscal competition limits the inefficiencies of governmental bureaucracy and encourages 
governments to allocate resources efficiently. On the other side are economists who argue that 
competition among governments amount to little more than a zero-sum game in which 
governments squander resources chasing after a mobile tax base leading to an erosion of 
welfare state arrangements. Given the competing theories, the welfare consequences of 
government competition become an empirical question.6 One approach to assess the welfare 
consequences of fiscal competition is suggested in Chapter 5. The idea is that how fiscal 
decentralization (and consequently fiscal competition) affects the composition of government 
spending can provide some valuable insight into the normative implications of fiscal 
competition. As a first investigation, this analysis divides government spending into two 
categories, transfer spending and government consumption. Decentralization of taxing powers 
yields less transfer spending, but not less government consumption. Since fiscal competition 
is likely to put a downward pressure on redistributive spending also in the absence of 
inefficient government, one may speculate that fiscal decentralization does not act as a 
powerful instrument to prevent policy makers from wasting resources. A further refinement of 
the composition of government may be able to better examine whether this is valid reasoning.  
The welfare consequences of fiscal competition do not necessarily have to be evaluated within 
countries. Some economists are worried that increasing mobility of firms and workers may 
give rise to competitive forces, leading the European countries to move in the direction of the 
US social security system. The realism of such a scenario is not clear. One potential approach 
to assess the importance of fiscal competition among EU countries is to rely on a spatial 
interaction model. The huge cross section heterogeneity is however likely to be a confounding 
factor. It is probably more fruitful to evaluate auxiliary predictions derived from theory. One 
approach would be to focus on the tools available to national governments, e.g.  ‘Has closer 
6 Although theoretical work along the lines of Edwards and Keen (1996) may be helpful.  
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European integration lead to a shift in taxation from mobile to less mobile tax bases?’. 
Another approach would be to focus on the outcome of increased fiscal competition: e.g. ‘has 
closer European integration lead to welfare state arrangements that do a poorer job at reducing 
inequality?’. These questions, interesting in their own right, may also shed some light on the 
welfare consequences of fiscal competition. 
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Abstract
This paper evaluates the empirical importance of welfare competition. Our contribution is to
separate the welfare benefit norm decided at the political level from the actual welfare benefit
payments of a standardized person. Utilizing spatial econometric methods, we find statistical
significant and similar strategic interaction between local governments for both politicians (norm)
and bureaucrats (actual benefits). We do not find support for an income effect representing altruism,
which is the standard explanation for welfare benefits in the theoretical literature. The strategic
interaction and geographic pattern identified do not necessarily imply underprovision, since the grant
financing of the local governments may generate overall excessive public spending.
D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights rseved.
JEL classification: C21; D78; H73
Keywords: Welfare benefits; Fiscal competition; Strategic interaction; Spatial econometrics
1. Introduction
Globalization with increased mobility of households and firms is often described as a
threat to distribution policy. Some state this challenge in dramatic terms, with titles such as
dcan the welfare state survive?T and with propositions of a drace to the bottomT. The issue
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has raised policy concern about fiscal decentralization and in particular about EU
integration. Sinn (1994) has warned about the consequences of economic integration for
welfare policy. Nannestad (2004) describes how immigration challenges the Danish
welfare state.
A large literature initiated by Musgrave (1959) and Stigler (1957) warns against
decentralization of the responsibility of distribution. Governments are encouraged to set
fiscal variables to influence the location of households and firms when mobility is high,
and the consequent fiscal competition may give an incentive to reduce redistribution. The
comprehensive theoretical literature is not matched by much empirical evidence. It should
also be noticed that welfare competition may arise even without mobility. The
performance of neighboring municipalities may give voters information to evaluate their
own municipality. Salmon (1987) discusses the argument for decentralization based on
such yardstick competition, and Besley and Case (1995) offer empirical evidence that it
matters for policy.
In the domain of welfare policy, countries have typically decentralized responsibilities
to states and municipalities, to take advantage of local administration and knowledge. The
associated welfare competition may threaten the implemented welfare policy. When
taxpayers and welfare recipients are mobile, it seems likely that the local governments will
seek to attract wealthy households and avoid potential welfare recipients. The empirical
importance of such welfare competition is addressed in a series of U.S. studies
summarized by Brueckner (2000) and in recent studies of the UK (Revelli, 2004) and
Sweden (Dahlberg and Edmark, 2004). The present paper provides empirical evidence for
another country with decentralized welfare policy, Norway. The contribution of the paper
is to separate welfare policy decisions from actual welfare payments. We also throw light
on the importance of the local income level, the altruism effect that dominates the
theoretical literature.
The implementation of welfare policies includes the guidelines set by political
institutions and the actual payments made by the welfare bureaucracy. This complicated
line of implementation is typically overlooked in empirical studies. The U.S. studies have
concentrated on the benefit levels for AFDC (Aid to families with dependent children) and
most authors (Berry et al., 2003; Figlio et al., 1999; Saavedra, 2000) have used the
maximum amount given to a standardized family as the measure of benefit level.
According to Peterson and Rom (1990), the maximum consists of a dneeds standardT and a
share of the standard covered. States differ both in their assessment of needs and in the
share financed. Actual expenditures per recipient are used by Bailey and Rom (2004) for
the U.S., Revelli (2004) for the UK, and Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) for Sweden.
Average actual benefit payments represent both discretion in the welfare bureaucracy and
composition effects. Bailey and Rom (2004) argue that maximum benefits and average
benefits are highly correlated for AFDC. In our data there are large composition effects
when average benefits are compared, primarily as a result of different duration of welfare
spells.
The relationship between politically determined norms and actual welfare payments
to the clients represent a key linkage in the public choice literature between politics
and bureaucracy. Under an assumption of rationality, the local politicians will take into
account bureaucratic behavior when norms are set. The variation in both norms and
J.H. Fiva, J. Rattsø / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 202–222 203
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actual benefits are investigated below. The norms are set as guidelines for the
administration and are specified as an amount paid to a dstandard userT (single individual
without children) per month. The estimates of welfare competition in norms reflect the
political response.
The analysis of actual welfare benefits is based on a unique dataset of computed
expected benefits in each municipality based on individual characteristics, worked out
and documented by Langørgen and Rønningen (2004). They utilize data for most of the
adult population in Norway (more than 2.5 million individuals) and estimate expected
welfare benefits received for comparable individuals. Welfare benefits are means-tested
and based on an evaluation of the demands of each individual on a case-by-case basis.
The individual demands vary and the welfare recipient population is quite heteroge-
neous, ranging from individuals in need for support for a few weeks to quite permanent
welfare clients. The expected benefit measure is an attempt to take into account this
heterogeneity.
In the analysis we investigate the possibility that the decisions of Norwegian local
governments about welfare benefit levels depend on the benefit level in dneighboringT
municipalities.1 We apply spatial econometrics methods to estimate the strategic
interaction among local governments. The starting point is a fiscal demand function
where the benefit level in each municipality depends on benefits in neighboring
municipalities as well as on economic and political characteristics. The endogeneity of
other municipalities’ welfare benefits is handled with instrumental variables.
Section 2 outlines the welfare competition mechanism, Section 3 presents the
econometric design, and the data are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents and
discusses our estimated interaction models, and Section 6 discusses other determinants of
welfare benefits. A short summary of results and challenges for future research are
presented in the Concluding section.
2. Welfare competition mechanism
Centralization or decentralization of redistribution policy is an old issue in the
economics literature. Oates (1972) offers an early analysis of the role of mobility, whereby
local redistribution can chase the rich to other municipalities and attract the poor. Orr
(1976) formalizes the altruistic argument for welfare benefits, and shows that poor living
in municipalities where they are a small fraction of the population are expected to receive
higher welfare benefits than in municipalities where they are a large fraction. This cost
effect implies that an inflow of poor people to a municipality will reduce the benefit level.
Brown and Oates (1987) extend the Orr framework to include a migration function
explicitly, which shows the elasticity of the number of poor with respect to the benefit
level. They derive how the benefit level varies inversely with the elasticity of the migration
1 In most empirical analysis the neighborhood concept refers to geographic proximity. However, neighbors may
be selected on the basis of similarity in population size, demographic composition, income, etc. In our empirical
approach, we apply a definition of neighbors based on contiguity.
J.H. Fiva, J. Rattsø / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 202–222204
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function. The mobility of the poor is a source of inefficiency in decentralized systems. The
extensive theoretical literature on mobility and redistribution is summarized by Cremer
and Pestieau (2004).
A simple and attractive theoretical framework relevant for our analysis is set out by
Wheaton (2000). A fixed national welfare population is distributed among municipalities
and receives municipality specific welfare benefits. The welfare population is assumed
small relative to the total population, and the decisive representative voter is an
employed immobile taxpayer. The municipalities differ in population size and private
income level. As a reference point, if we assume that the welfare benefit decision is
taken at the national level, there is no welfare migration to take into account and the
relevant tax price for benefits is the share of recipients in the population. This result
reproduces Orr (1976). When welfare benefits are decentralized and welfare migration is
taken into account, the response of the welfare recipients is internalized in the political
decision. Wheaton develops the migration story of Brown and Oates (1987),
emphasizing the elasticity of the recipients with respect to the benefit level. The
elasticity raises the tax price of benefits and consequently contributes to underprovision
compared to the national decision.
The migration part of the model assumes that welfare recipients have their own
evaluation of the attractiveness of each municipality, and in addition to this their utility
depends on the welfare benefits received in each municipality. The likelihood that
recipients locate in a specific municipality follows a logistic function. This supply side
of the welfare market implies a positive relationship between benefit level and welfare
recipients in the migration equilibrium. The demand side shows how the political
decision about the benefit level depends on the size of the welfare recipient group, and
the benefit level will be reduced when the number of recipients goes up. The decision
is affected by the benefit level in all municipalities through the endogenous
determination of welfare recipients. The geographic pattern of benefits and recipients
will depend on the migration response of the welfare recipients. When the migration
response is strong, all municipalities spend less on welfare. The supply of welfare
recipients is responsive to the benefit level, the benefit levels will vary little, but the
recipient shares will vary much. The overall pattern will show small variation in
benefits, but large variation in recipient shares. On the other hand, when the migration
response is small, we expect a pattern with large variation in benefits and small
variation in recipient shares. The mechanisms of the model are similar to the assumed
moving costs in Smith (1991). When psychic moving costs vary by individual, the
competitive mechanism mainly will be represented by the individual welfare recipients
with low moving costs.
An alternative understanding of the equilibrium mechanism in the U.S. studies assumes
wage adjustment. Brueckner (2000) presents the adjustment mechanism based on Wildasin
(1991), which is also discussed by Saavedra (2000) and Dahlberg and Edmark (2004). In
this setup, the welfare recipients earn unskilled wage income at the labor market, and the
wage response secures migration equilibrium. There is a cost effect of the number of
welfare recipients, but also a wage effect. The wage adjustment may give negatively
sloped reaction functions, since higher benefits at a neighbor will induce outmigration and
higher unskilled wage level, thereby motivating lower benefits. It seems unrealistic in our
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context to give such a prominent role to the unskilled wage adjustment, since most of the
recipients are outside the labor market.
There is a separate literature addressing the mobility of welfare recipients. Most
observers will agree with the conclusion of Meyer (2000), based on the U.S. evidence, that
there is welfare induced migration but that it is modest in magnitude. There are serious
methodological challenges to identifying welfare migration. Actual migration flows may
be small because municipalities respond to the competitive pressure. When local
governments harmonize their welfare benefit levels to avoid in-migration of welfare
recipients, the incentives to move are reduced. It follows that welfare competition may be
important even when welfare migration is negligible.
The Wheaton model offers more specific hypotheses about municipality characteristics,
in particular the private income level. Municipalities with higher private income level (and
also with higher grants) have higher marginal benefit of altruism and will set a higher
benefit level and have higher share of welfare recipients. Other rationales for redistribution
to the poor can be argued. The marginal benefit of redistribution may increase with income
due to a desire to reduce the negative externalities attached to poverty (such as crime, etc).
Redistribution is not necessarily increasing with income level of the municipality. If
income level reflects the extent of poverty, social insurance may lead to higher
redistribution with lower income level. The possibility of becoming poor motivates the
non-poor majority to redistribute. This leads to political economy arguments that may
imply a negative relationship between income level and benefit level. Boadway and Keen
(2000) give an overview of motives for and politics of redistribution. The political aspects
generally imply that income distribution influences the redistribution policy. The key
hypothesis was suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1981), that more inequality generates
more distribution. We include a measure of the income distribution as a control variable
here.
The theoretical literature of welfare competition discussed above implies a simulta-
neous determination of welfare benefits and welfare recipients. We concentrate on the
reduced form determination of welfare benefits. The estimated equation for welfare
benefits in municipality i under strategic interaction can be written:
bi ¼ bi b1; :: ; bi1; biþ1; :: ; bI ; yi; sið Þ ð1Þ
Welfare benefit level in municipality i is bi and covers all I municipalities. The average
income level of municipality i is yi, and si is a measure of the income distribution. The
response of the benefit level in municipality i to the benefit level in other municipalities
indicates welfare competition, the decision about benefit level in each municipality is not
taken in isolation.
3. Empirical modeling of welfare competition
Strategic interaction is known as spatial autocorrelation in the econometric literature.
The formal framework used for the statistical analysis of spatial autocorrelation is a so-
called spatial stochastic process. We follow the most frequently used approach to formally
express spatial autocorrelation and specify a functional form for the spatial stochastic
J.H. Fiva, J. Rattsø / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 202–222206
19
process that relates the value of the random variable at a given location to its value at other
locations:2
b ¼ aWbþ xbþ u ð2Þ
where b is a vector of welfare benefit levels, W is the spatial weights matrix, x is a matrix
of welfare benefit determinants of every municipality, b is a vector of parameters and u is
a vector of iid error terms with variance ru
2. For each municipality W assigns
municipalities of reference (referred to as dneighborsT in the literature) and their relative
weights. The weights are determined a priori and can be considered as part of jurisdiction
i’s basic characteristics. In this analysis we follow the literature on fiscal competition and
choose a definition of neighbors as municipalities with a common border. For ease of
interpretation the elements of W are row-standardized, such that for each i,
P
jwij =1.
3
Then Wb yields a spatially weighted average of the welfare benefits in the neighboring
municipalities. While the choice of weights is based on prior evaluation concerning the
pattern of interaction, the interaction effect, a, is estimated from the data. a can be
interpreted as the slope coefficient of the reaction function and is the parameter of interest.
An econometric challenge is that the spatial lag term Wb is correlated with the
disturbances, even when the latter are iid. This can be seen from the reduced form of (2).
Assuming that (IaW) is invertible, the reduced form is given by:
b ¼ I aWð Þ1xbþ I aWð Þ1u ð3Þ
implying that
E Wbð Þu0ð Þ ¼ W I aWð Þ1r2u p 0: ð4Þ
When the welfare benefit levels of the municipalities are potentially interdependent, we
must model the determination of benefits as simultaneous. Standard Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation yields in this case biased and inconsistent estimators. If the
proper specification of the model is given by (2) and the welfare competition hypothesis is
right (a N0) then OLS gives an upward bias in the estimate of a. The literature suggests
two different approaches to handle the simultaneity. We can either estimate the reduced-
form Eq. (3) by Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods or we can apply an Instrument
Variable (IV) approach. The ML method rests strongly on the assumptions about the
normality of the error terms and this might not be appropriate. We return to this issue
below. The IV approach is more intuitively appealing—the spatially weighted average of
benefit levels is replaced with fitted values from an auxiliary regression. With proper
instruments the IV method yields unbiased and consistent estimates.4 In the empirical
analysis carried out in Section 5 we utilize the solution proposed by Kelejian and
Robinson (1993) namely to use Wx as instruments. This is in line with what Besley and
Case (1995) and Figlio et al. (1999) among others do. However, realizing that invalid
2 For other possible approaches, see Anselin (2001).
3 This implies that wij=1/mi when municipality i and j share a border and 0 otherwise (mi being the number of
neighbours to municipality i).
4 Valid instruments are correlated with Wb, but uncorrelated with the error terms from (2).
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instruments may cause biases in the estimates we also include ML estimates in the
empirical analysis. This is the approach pursued by Saavedra (2000). Revelli (2004)
applies both methods.
An observed spatial pattern in welfare benefits is not necessarily due to competition
among local governments. Also common shocks and unobserved correlates will appear as
spatial auto-correlation. It is obviously of great importance to separate the former spatial
lag dependence from the latter spatial error dependence. With spatially correlated omitted
variables, we have a pattern of spatial error dependence of the form:
u ¼ kMuþ e ð5Þ
where e is a well behaved error vector and M is a neighbor matrix. ML estimation that
assumes that u is iid yields in this case biased estimates. Estimating such a model can in
principle lead to a false conclusion of welfare competition (a N0) when a =0 holds in the
true model.5 In Section 5 we apply the robust LM tests proposed by Anselin et al. (1996)
to test whether k =0. However, an observed spatial autocorrelation (a p 0) is not
attributable to common unobservable shocks that may have hit neighboring municipalities
when the spatial lag model is estimated with the IV method with valid instruments (see
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) for a formal proof of this property). An observed correlation
will be caused by changes in the component of neighbors benefit levels that is attributable
to neighbors’ (exogenous) observable variables. The concern for lack of identification of
welfare competition is related to the difference between endogenous and exogenous
interactions emphasized by Moffitt (2001). Our approach assumes away exogenous
interaction, that benefit levels are influenced by characteristics of the neighboring
municipalities other than their benefit level. This will be discussed below.
To identify strategic interaction between local governments in Norway, we estimate this
(second stage) empirical counterpart of Eqs. (1) and (2):
bi ¼ b0 þ a
Xn
j¼1
wijbj þ
XK
k¼1
bkCONTROLki þ ui: ð6Þ
We apply a set of K control variables.6 The discussion in Section 3 includes two key
demand variables, the average private income level (y¯) and a measure of the income
distribution (s). The skewness of the income distribution is represented by the ratio of
median to mean income ym=y¯ð Þ. This is the standard measure of income distribution in the
literature relating to the Meltzer–Richard hypothesis and the same variable as applied by
Borge and Rattsø (2004) in a study of taxation and income distribution in Norway. The
5 Consider for example the case where the error term is given by (5) and there is no strategic interaction (a =0).
Assuming thatM=W and substituting (5) into (2) yields in this case: b =kWb +xBkWxb +e. Note that except
for the extra term, kWxb, this model has the same bappearanceQ as the model in (2). The error autoregressive
parameter k appears now as the parameter of the lagged dependent variableWb and we may falsely reject the null
hypothesis of no strategic interaction.
6 The first stage regression is given by:
P
j¼1
n
wˆijbj¼cþ
P
k¼1
K
mk
P
j¼1
n
wijCONTROLkjþ
P
k¼1
K
gkCONTROLki, where c, mk
and gk are 2*K +1 parameters to be estimated.
J.H. Fiva, J. Rattsø / European Journal of Political Economy 22 (2006) 202–222208
21
additional set of control variables is based on findings from earlier studies of Norwegian
local government behavior, notably Borge and Rattsø (1995).7 First, the main source of
revenue is grants ( g) including block grants and regulated income and wealth taxes.
Second, the population size (n) of the municipalities may influence costs and preferences.
Third, the local government services are partly age specific (like schooling) and the
preferences vary with the age composition of the population, and hence the population
shares of children (ch), young (yo) and elderly (el) are included. Fourth, the share of
socialists in the local council (soc) is incorporated as control variable to capture
ideological differences. Finally we control for the differences in cost of living across
municipalities, using a price index (per square meter) for used freeholder houses (sqm
price).8
Social characteristics of the population (such as unemployed) are certainly relevant to
capture the demand for welfare benefits, but they are influenced by the welfare migration
and consequently are endogenous. They are excluded from our basic regression model, but
the robustness of our results is investigated by including education level, unemployment
rate and the share of divorced, to be discussed in Section 5.
4. Data: chosen welfare benefit levels in Norway
Welfare benefits in Norway are decentralized to local governments. Assistance to the
poor has been a local responsibility for more than 150 years, and the basic argument is that
the local governments have the knowledge about the population and its living conditions
needed to set the benefit level. The Norwegian population of about 4.5 million is divided
into 434 local governments with an average size of 10,000 inhabitants. The local
governments are democratic institutions led by an elected local council. The financing of
the local governments is highly centralized (grants and regulated income and wealth taxes)
with some discretion related to user charges and property taxation.
The welfare policy of the local governments is based on law. The welfare benefit
system is regulated by the Social Service Act, which states criteria and guidelines for the
cash benefits. The benefits are meant to cover basic food, clothing and housing. The long-
term recipients, about 60,000 in all, are dominated by young drug addicts and grown up
unemployed without unemployment benefits. Short-term recipients are young and old
unemployed with better connections to the labor market. The local governments have
substantial discretion in determining the welfare benefits, both regarding eligibility and the
level of benefits. This discretion yields substantial variation in the benefit levels across
municipalities. The central government influences the incentives of the local governments
by two elements of the grant system. The first is tax equalization where low per capita
income tax revenues are compensated by about 90% below the average. The second is
expenditure equalization where characteristics of the population (in particular age
7 Description of variables and descriptive statistics are found in Appendix Table A.1.
8 In preliminary analysis we also tested for the possible impact of the share of women in the local council, party
fragmentation of the local council, local government interest payments and settlement pattern, but they were all
found to have no impact on the welfare benefit levels and are therefore excluded from the analysis presented.
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composition) and local cost factors are taken into account in the calculation of the block
grant. These elements imply that local governments do not face the full economic
consequences of welfare migration.
Empirical research has addressed the differences in welfare benefit spending between
local governments, and these studies have served as input to the expenditure equalization
system. Langørgen (1995) concentrates on welfare benefit spending per capita and shows
how they vary first and for all with social characteristics such as unemployment, share of
refugees in the population, and family structure (share of divorced in the population). He
also separates between welfare benefit spending per recipient on average and share of
welfare recipients in the population. As expected, the social characteristics (unemploy-
ment, refugees, divorced) strongly increase the share of welfare recipients. The average
benefits per recipient reflect composition effects. Average benefits increase with the share
of refugees and the share of divorced and decrease with social security participation.
Midtsundstad et al. (1999) have written a reanalysis of Langørgen using more recent and
more detailed data and with basically the same results. The political decision of setting the
welfare benefit level and the welfare competition involved are not explicitly addressed in
these studies. In our context the social characteristics represent a potential endogeneity
problem. The main lesson we draw is that studies of actual average benefits per recipient
are likely to reflect important composition effects (refugees, unemployed, etc.) that are
hard to isolate.
Given the documented heterogeneity of welfare recipients among municipalities, it is a
challenge to describe the welfare benefit level in a comparative analysis. We are surprised
by the limited attention put to this problem in the empirical welfare competition literature.
We handle the challenge by separating between the welfare benefit norm set by the local
politicians and the actual welfare payments based on individual data. Welfare competition
is primarily a concern for local politicians. The actual benefit levels obtained at the
individual level will vary with the operation of the welfare offices and their social workers.
The welfare benefit norm decided at the local government level may not reach down to the
social workers handling each individual. To investigate differences at the political and
administrative level, we study the variation in norms for welfare benefit levels set by the
local councils. The norms are set as guidelines for the administration and are specified as
an amount paid to a dstandard userT per month. We utilize the reported norms for single
persons without children receiving welfare benefit per month measured in 1000 NOK in
1998 (bn). The norm set by the local council reflects the preferences of the politicians and
is consequently of interest independently of the actual individual benefit levels. Appendix
Table A.2 documents the variation. It should be noticed that the central government since
2001 has announced a national welfare benefit norm and most municipalities have
converged to this norm. The central government intervention can be understood as a
response to the large differences among municipalities observed in the data for 1998 that
we have available.
It is certainly of interest to investigate whether the welfare competition also affects the
actual welfare payments. Because of the heterogeneity of the welfare recipients,
comparison of actual welfare benefits between municipalities must be based on individual
data. Langørgen and Rønningen (2004) have estimated the relationship between individual
characteristics and welfare benefits based on a large dataset covering more than 2.5 million
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individuals in 433 municipalities in 1998. The analysis allows a calculation of the
expected welfare benefits for an individual with specific characteristics in each
municipality. The endogenous variable (b) is defined as expected welfare benefits for a
standardized reference person measured in 1000 NOK per year.9 The variation is described
in Appendix Table A.2 with an average of NOK 30.059 per year and varying from a
minimum of NOK 24.060 to a maximum of NOK 35.596.
The expected welfare benefits for a standard recipient include all payments received by
the individual, while the welfare benefit norm generally does not include housing
expenses. Housing costs vary by individual and are not stated as a norm by the politicians.
It follows that the two measures are not comparable and also the two measures of the
welfare benefit level show close to no correlation (the correlation coefficient is 0.05).
5. Estimated welfare competition
Empirical evidence of the welfare competition hypothesis implies a geographical
pattern in welfare benefits. Looking for such a pattern we start out by a description of
differences in welfare benefits at the county level in Appendix Table A.3. The welfare
benefit level varies between the 18 counties, and more important, the spread among
municipalities within each county varies. In particular we notice that expected benefits are
quite homogenous (low coefficient of variation) in counties with fairly small distances and
low transportation costs such as Østfold, Akershus, Hedmark, Oppland, Sør-Trøndelag
and Buskerud. On the other hand there are large differences in expected benefits within
counties with large distances and high transportation costs such as Sogn og Fjordane,
Nordland and Troms. These differences are consistent with welfare competition, but they
may also reflect differences in social and demographic structure and urbanization.
The classical measure of spatial dependence is the Moran statistic (Anselin, 2001). The
statistic can be considered as a spatial analog to time series autocorrelation and is formally
given by:
I ¼ u0Wu=u0u ð7Þ
where u is a vector of OLS residuals and W is the spatial weight matrix. The I-statistic is
computed under the null hypothesis that errors are normally distributed.
A natural first investigation of the spatial structure is to regress the endogenous
variables (b and bn) on a constant and evaluate the Moran statistic. This raw measure of
spatial dependence indicates a strong spatial pattern based on neighborhood. Leaving out
the strategic interaction term in Eq. (6) and estimating the model by OLS (reported as
model A in Tables 2 and 3), the Moran test still provides strong evidence for the existence
of spatial dependence for both measures of welfare benefits. The Moran test yields a value
of 6.70 and 5.34 for b and bn, respectively, indicating that we confidently can reject the
null hypothesis of absence of spatial autocorrelation. Note that the Moran test cannot say
9 The reference person is a single, Norwegian man, 16–30 years old who is neither disabled, nor long-term
unemployed. He has low education and pays no maintenance and receives no basic and supplementary benefits.
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whether it is spatial lag dependence or spatial error dependence that is the driving force
behind the spatial pattern. Anselin et al. (1996) have proposed two Lagrange Multiplier
(LM) tests based on the OLS residuals that are robust to the presence of local
misspecification of the other form of spatial dependence. These tests follow a v2
distribution with one degree of freedom and test for spatial lag dependence that is robust to
spatial error dependence (and vice versa).10 Results from the robust LM-tests based on our
OLS regressions for our two measures of welfare benefits are reported in Table 1.
Controlling for spatial error dependence, the H0 of absence of spatial lag dependence
(a=0) must be rejected for both our measures of benefit levels at the 1% level. The tests
also indicate some traces of spatial error dependence, but it is not statistically significant at
the 10% level. The LM tests that are not robust to misspecification of the model conclude
with the presence of both types of spatial dependence (not reported). When there is a clear
discrepancy between the regular and the robust LM test for spatial error dependence, and
both the regular and the robust test for spatial lag dependence are significant, then there is
strong evidence for spatial lag dependence (Anselin et al., 1996, p.97). The Monte Carlo
simulations by Anselin et al. indicate that the robust LM tests are more appropriate to test
for lag dependence in the presence of error dependence than for the reverse case. Thus, the
LM tests indicate that local governments tend to mimic each other in the determination of
welfare benefits and furthermore that the spatial lag model seems to give the best
description of the geographic pattern. We cannot completely eliminate the possibility of
error dependence and hence the ML estimates reported below may be biased.11 A strength
with the IV approach is that it yields estimates that are robust to the presence of spatial
error dependence, given that the instruments are properly chosen, as discussed in Section
3. For the instruments to be valid they need to be correlated with the spatially lagged
dependent variable and uncorrelated with the error term. To test for the latter property we
apply the Sargan (1958) test. This test follows a v2 distribution with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of overidentifying instruments. For both our measures of welfare
benefits we fail to reject the null of instrument exogeneity (reported in Tables 2 and 3). The
10 Anselin et al. (1996) also investigate the performance of the tests under Monte Carlo simulation experiments.
They show that the robust LM tests perform better than their unadjusted counterparts and that the tests also
perform well when the left-out type of dependence is not present.
Table 1
Tests for spatial dependence
Expected welfare benefits (b) Welfare benefit norm (bn)
Moran’s I 6.70 (0.00) 5.34 (0.00)
Robust LM for spatial lag
dependence (H0 :a =0)
12.03 (0.00) 11.18 (0.00)
Robust LM for spatial error
dependence (H0 :k =0)
2.22 (0.14) 2.48 (0.12)
Tests based on the OLS residuals from specification A in Tables 2 and 3. p-values in parentheses. Critical values
for the v(1)
2 is 2.71, 3.84 and 6.63 for the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
11 In principle it is possible to estimate a model that allows for both types of spatial auto-correlation, but reliable
estimation of the separate parameters a and k is difficult.
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test results presented indicate that estimation of a spatial lag model based on both ML and
IVapproaches seem fruitful. In Tables 2 and 3 we also report two OLS specifications of (6)
as baselines for comparison.
The focus in Table 2 is on the computed welfare benefits based on individual data
(b). We find an economically as well as statistically significant interaction effect. The
reaction curves are found to be upward sloping, higher benefits in neighboring
municipalities lead to higher benefits of the municipality considered. Interpreting the
result in terms of the Wheaton model, higher benefits in neighboring municipalities raise
the marginal utility of the benefits in the municipality and consequently lead to higher
benefits. In game theoretic terms welfare benefit levels in contiguous municipalities are
strategic complements. The quantitative effect of the IV estimation implies that an
increase in the welfare benefit level by NOK 1000 per year in neighboring
municipalities will raise the benefit level in the municipality by NOK 800 per year.12
The ML and OLS estimates indicate a somewhat smaller interaction effect and predict
an equivalent increase of benefits of NOK 390 and NOK 610 per year. The OLS estimates
may be biased for two reasons, first because of the endogeneity of welfare benefits
(upward bias) and second because of spatial error correlation. The spatial error correlation
typically is negative under migration and endogenous sorting of the welfare recipients, and
Table 2
Dependent variable: b (expected welfare benefit of standardized recipient, based on individual data estimation)
A OLS B OLS C IV D ML
spatial lag (a) 0.61*** (0.08) 0.80*** (0.19) 0.39*** (0.06)
y¯ 0.033*** (0.006) 0.023*** (0.006) 0.020*** (0.007) 0.027*** (0.006)
ym
y¯
1.32 (1.54) 0.86 (1.43) 0.71 (1.45) 1.03 (1.43)
g 0.040** (0.020) 0.033* (0.018) 0.031* (0.019) 0.035* (0.018)
log n 0.75** (0.30) 0.56** (0.28) 0.51* (0.29) 0.63** (0.28)
ch 26.90*** (10.20) 14.40 (9.57) 10.65 (10.24) 18.86** (9.45)
yo 8.05 (6.97) 5.41 (6.49) 4.61 (6.58) 6.36 (6.48)
el 12.59*** (3.89) 7.79** (3.67) 6.33 (3.92) 9.51*** (3.62)
soc 1.45** (0.64) 0.50 (0.60) 0.22 (0.66) 0.84 (0.60)
sqm price 0.16** (0.08) 0.14* (0.07) 0.13* (0.08) 0.15* (0.08)
R2adj 0.117 0.236
# obs. 433 433 433 433
Sargana 7.13 (0.52)
Data on welfare benefits are from Langørgen and Rønningen (2004), statistics Norway. Standard errors in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. A constant term is
included in all regressions (not reported).
a Sargan (1958) test with 8 degrees of freedom, p-value in parenthesis.
12 The number of neighbors range from 1 to 11. The median number of neighbors is 5. This indicates that for a
typical municipality, an increase in one of the neighbors’ benefit level with 1000 NOK will raise the benefit level
in the municipality with 160 NOK.
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this negative effect dominates in our case.13 This understanding is consistent with the ML
estimates being smaller than the IV estimates. ML takes into account the simultaneity in
the determination of welfare benefits, but is sensitive to left out spatial error correlation.
Bordignon et al. (2003) discuss ways of separating yardstick competition from mobility
competition, and they argue that yardstick competition is expected to generate positive
spatial error dependence.
When welfare competition shows up in actual welfare payments above, we also
expect to identify welfare competition when measured by the politically determined
welfare norm. The estimates based on the reported welfare norms are shown in Table 3.
The results confirm strategic interaction, upward sloping reaction curves, and
quantitative effects similar to those of expected welfare benefits in Table 2. The
reaction coefficient is 0.81 for the welfare norm compared to 0.80 for computed welfare
benefits, when estimated by instrument variables. Again we find that aˆMLb aˆOLSb aˆIV,
and all the estimates are of the same magnitude in the two tables. Given that the two
measures describe different aspects of the local welfare benefit, the similar results for the
two are comforting.
The robustness of the results has been checked in various alternative specifications not
reported. When the income distribution variable is excluded, the strategic interactions and
the private income effects are basically the same. We have been more concerned with the
heterogeneity issue, in particular since earlier empirical research has found social
characteristics to be important determinants of welfare benefits. In our setting they are
13 Besley and Case (1995), Figlio et al. (1999) and Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) also find OLS to be downward
biased.
Table 3
Dependent variable: bn (welfare benefit norm per recipient)
A OLS B OLS C IV D ML
spatial lag (a) 0.59*** (0.08) 0.81*** (0.18) 0.36*** (0.06)
y¯ 0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
ym
y¯
1.91*** (0.56) 1.17** (0.54) 0.90 (0.58) 1.47*** (0.53)
g 0.017** (0.007) 0.010 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) 0.013* (0.007)
log n 0.08 (0.11) 0.08 (0.10) 0.08 (0.11) 0.08 (0.10)
ch 3.84 (3.71) 0.77 (3.57) 2.46 (3.80) 1.06 (3.51)
yo 7.07*** (2.55) 4.82** (2.43) 4.00 (2.52) 5.71** (2.40)
el 2.59* (1.42) 1.32 (1.36) 0.85 (1.41) 1.82 (1.34)
soc 0.19 (0.23) 0.12 (0.22) 0.09 (0.22) 0.15 (0.22)
sqm price 0.04 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Housing included 0.45*** (0.11) 0.46*** (0.10) 0.47*** (0.11) 0.46*** (0.10)
R2adj 0.135 0.229
# obs. 433 433 433 433
Sargana 8.30 (0.50)
Data on welfare benefits are from dSosialstatistikkT, Statistics Norway. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and
* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. A constant term is included in all regressions (not
reported).
a Sargan (1958) test with 9 degrees of freedom, p-value in parenthesis.
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problematic control variables because of endogenous sorting of households. We have run
regression including three social characteristics, the shares of the population that are
unemployed, divorced and have 9 years of education or less. Inclusion of these variables
does not have any impact on the estimated reaction coefficient for the politically
determined norm. The estimated reaction coefficient based on the expected welfare
benefits (b) is reduced in this specification (aˆIV=0.29** (0.14), aˆML=0.29*** (0.06)), but
is still statistically significant. We conclude that it of interest to pursue the sorting issue in
future research.
The empirical literature on welfare competition basically offers evidence about the U.S.
states and the AFDC-program (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). The two main
studies of strategic interaction, Figlio et al. (1999) and Saavedra (2000), conclude that
strategic interaction is important, Figlio et al. find reaction coefficients of the sign and size
reported here, about 0.9. They show that the effect is asymmetric, and the competition
effect is only significant downwards, that is when neighboring states reduce their benefit
level. Saavedra’s result also suggests that American states behave strategically in setting
their AFDC benefits. Brueckner (2000) has summarized the existing U.S. evidence,
including studies addressing welfare migration. We only know two studies outside the
U.S. states. Revelli (2004) analyses social service spending in UK local governments and
identifies an interaction effect with elasticity of 0.2. He concludes that this is likely to
follow from yardstick competition. His econometric design in particular attempts at
separating between the consequences of common shocks and interaction, and he finds no
spatial error interdependence representing common shocks. Dahlberg and Edmark (2004)
apply an approach similar to ours for Swedish data of welfare benefits, having the
advantage of a panel and utilizing placement of refugees as an exogenous instrument.
They find statistically significant strategic interaction effects at a magnitude of 0.65. Our
study consequently adds to the building up of international evidence that welfare
competition matters.
6. Other determinants of welfare benefits
The theoretical models of welfare competition discussed in Section 2 emphasize the
level of private income as a determinant of welfare benefits, and that redistribution is
motivated by altruism. Higher private income levels are associated with a higher welfare
benefit level. Our estimates do not support the altruism theory. The private income level
has a significantly negative effect on the expected welfare benefits based on actual
payments (Table 2) and is independent of the politically determined welfare benefit
norm (Table 3). The result challenges the key approach in the theoretical literature on
welfare competition. The interaction and income effects add up to a geographic pattern.
Akershus, for example, is a private rich county close to Oslo with quite low welfare
benefits and with little variation across municipalities. Finnmark, on the other hand, has
low private income level, more variation across municipalities, and generally high
welfare benefits.
We have investigated the income effect further by using instruments. It can be argued
that the private income level is endogenous and affected by the mobility of welfare
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clients. If a low income level reflects many poor and potential welfare clients, the
negative income effect may reflect the supply of poor. The private income level is
instrumented with 8 variables representing the industrial structure (labor shares in
8 groups of industries). The strategic interaction is reproduced in this case, and only the
statistical significance of the income effect is affected. The negative income effect for
the actual benefits is now not statistically significant, while the negative income effect
for the benefit norm is significant.
The empirical literature, as summarized by Ribar and Wilhelm (1999) for U.S.
welfare benefits, is inconclusive regarding income effects. Analyses in general report a
positive relationship between private income level and benefit levels, but exceptions do
occur. Gramlich and Laren (1984) argue that the most likely reason for a negative
income effect is a motive for income security: bVoters may be more inclined to vote
for transfer benefits if they feel they may need them some day, due to uncertainty
about their own income. They may even empathize more with transfer recipients if
subject to uncertainty in their own income streamQ (1984, p.492). This rationale to
redistribute might be driving our negative impact of private income on expected
welfare benefits.
In addition to this possible interpretation, we direct attention to the working of the grant
system. The equalizing grant system basically turns around the private income differences
between municipalities. The municipalities with a high private income level end up with
relatively low local government revenue per capita, while private poor municipalities end
up as relatively rich local governments. The grants, including regulated taxes and
representing about 80% of local government revenue on average, have a positive effect on
the welfare benefit level (although not statistically significant for the IV-estimates in Table
3). Rich local governments tend to have higher welfare benefits. In the example above,
Finnmark has local government revenue per capita well above the average and Akershus
well below. When local government revenue is not much associated with the local private
income level, the private income variable basically reflects preferences for local
government services. Given this interpretation, the preference for welfare benefits is
declining with private income in Table 2.
We have extended the analysis of private income to control for the importance of the
income distribution. The empirical literature investigating the Meltzer–Richards
hypothesis has focused on the size of the public sector and has utilized cross-country
data. The results are basically negative: countries with large inequality do not have
larger public sector. We believe that it is more productive to look at the hypothesis in the
context of decentralized government with comparable institutions. Alesina et al. (2000)
exploit this type of data in a recent study of U.S. cities, and find a positive relationship
between inequality and public employment. Borge and Rattsø (2004) show that more
equal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from property taxes to poll
taxes and thereby gives less redistribution in Norwegian local governments. Encouraged
by these findings, we look at the relationship between inequality and welfare benefits,
and the income distribution as measured by the ratio of median to mean income. The
ratio of median to mean is negatively related to the expected welfare benefits in Table 2,
the benefits are then increasing with inequality, but the coefficients are never statistically
significant. We find a positive relationship between equality and the welfare benefit
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norms, reported in Table 3, and the effect is statistically significant in the OLS and ML
estimations. The result that inequality tends to reduce the welfare benefit level is
consistent with a cost effect of redistribution. The only study we know of income
distribution and welfare spending is Rodriguez (1999) for the U.S. states, and he finds
no statistically significant relationship.
Two other aspects of the political decision making are included. First, the age
distribution of the population represents the demand for local welfare services, which to
a large extent are directed towards children, young and elderly. We expect that larger
’client’ groups of the welfare services may crowd out welfare benefits, since they
compete within the local government budget. Our ML estimates of expected welfare
benefits in Table 2 do indicate such competition between welfare services and welfare
benefits, especially with respect to the share of children and elderly. However, the
coefficients are not statistically significant in the IV specifications. The crowding out is
not identified for the welfare norm in Table 3, and it is puzzling that the ML estimates
indicate a positive effect of some age groups. Second, we incorporate political
preferences by including socialist share of representation in the local council. Ideology
has been shown to be important for the priorities in many other studies of Norwegian
local governments. In this context it is an important control also in the analysis of
private income level and income distribution as determinants. The sign of the coefficient
is, as expected, that a larger share of socialists in the local council is associated with
more generous welfare benefits, but the coefficient is only statistically significant in the
benchmark OLS version of Table 2.
Finally, we have applied some other controls. According to the Wheaton model,
larger municipalities in population size are expected to have lower tax price for
redistribution and therefore choose to have higher benefit level. The expected welfare
benefits in Table 2 do increase with population size, when the variable is inserted on
logarithmic form. A measure of housing costs in the municipality (sqm price) is
important for the expected welfare benefits including support for housing. The welfare
benefit norms exclude housing support in about 95% of the municipalities, and a
significant dummy variable represents those including such costs (raising the norm by
approximately NOK 460 per month).
7. Concluding remarks
When the allocation of welfare benefits is decentralized to local governments,
incentives for welfare migration are created that may result in dunderprovisionT or even
a drace to the bottomT. It is an empirical issue whether this is important. We contribute to
the empirical evaluation of welfare competition in an analysis of welfare benefits in
Norway. The study separates the policy decision from the actual welfare benefit payments.
The former is the welfare benefit norm decided by the local council, while the latter is
based on individual data and is calculated as the expected welfare benefits of a
standardized person. Robust LM tests for spatial dependence of both measures conclude
that the H0 of absence of spatial lag dependence must be rejected at the 1% level of
significance. To further investigate the relationship, we have utilized spatial econometric
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methods in specifying a reaction function in which the welfare benefit level in one
municipality depends on the benefit levels in neighboring municipalities and own
socioeconomic characteristics. The estimated strategic interaction between local munic-
ipalities is statistically significant for both measures of welfare benefit level and the effect
is of the same size. It follows that welfare competition is equally important for the
politically determined norm and the actual welfare payments. The politicians and the
bureaucrats respond in coordinated fashion.
There are differences in the determinants of the benefit levels between the two
measures, however. The negative income effect seems to be somewhat stronger for the
actual benefit payments than for the benefit norm. The result indicates that the bureaucrats
are more responsive to income levels than the politicians. More unequal income
distribution reduces the benefit norm but does not affect the actual benefit payments. A
possible interpretation is that politicians react to the cost effect of more inequality but the
bureaucrats do not.
In theory, welfare competition implies underprovision of welfare benefits. In the
Norwegian system, the centralized grants financing of the local governments may result in
overall excessive spending. It follows that we cannot say that welfare competition leads to
dtoo lowT welfare benefits in Norway but we can conclude that there is a geographic
pattern in welfare benefits. Our analysis indicates that the observed spatial pattern is not
attributable to common unobservable shocks that may have affected neighboring
municipalities, nor to omitted spatially correlated variables. The strategic interaction is
caused by changes in the component of the neighbors’ benefit levels that is attributable to
neighbors’ observable variables, which we use as instruments.
The main econometric challenge is the separation between endogenous and exogenous
interaction raised by Moffitt (2001). Exogenous interaction occurs when the characteristics
of the municipalities applied as instruments for neighbor’s welfare benefits are
endogenous due to sorting of households. If this is the case, when benefit levels are
influenced by characteristics of the neighboring municipalities other than their benefit
level, the reaction coefficients do not necessarily imply strategic endogenous interaction.
Our Sargan test of the instrument variables indicates that they are exogenous. Dahlberg
and Edmark (2004) address this problem and apply placement of refugees as an instrument
in a panel data set. They conclude that exogenous interactions are negligible, and their
result supports our approach. Future research should address the issue of exogenous
interaction.
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Appendix A. Table A.1: Data definitions and descriptive statistics
Appendix B. Table A.2: Descriptives of the endogenous variables
Variable Description Mean (st.dev)
b Expected welfare benefits per standard recipient per year in
1000 NOK. The standardized reference person is a single,
Norwegian man, 16–30 years old, not disabled, not long-term
unemployed, low education, pays no maintenance, receives no
basic and supplementary benefits, 1998. The variable is
estimated and documented by Langørgen and Rønningen
(2004).
30.058 (1.646)
bn Reported welfare benefit norms for single persons, per month
measured in 1000 NOK. Source: dSosialstatistikkT, Statistics
Norway.
3.966 (0.607)
y¯ Average gross income for every person 17 years and older,
measured in 1000 NOK.
184.476 (21.354)
ym
y¯
Income distribution measured as the ratio of median to mean
income.
0.82 (0.05)
g The sum of lump-sum grants from the central government and
regulated income and wealth taxes, measured in 1000 NOK per
capita.
22.968 (6.031)
n Total population (1st of January 1998). 9048 (17,094)
ch The share of the population 0–5 years (1st of January 1998). 0.079 (0.011)
yo The share of the population 6–15 years (1st of January 1998). 0.133 (0.015)
el The share of the population 67 years and above (1st of January
1998).
0.158 (0.036)
soc The share of socialist representatives in the local council. A
socialist is defined as a representative belonging to one of the
following parties: NKP, RV, SV and AP.
0.374 (0.142)
sqm price Average municipal housing price per square meter in 1000
NOK. The price is computed for used freeholder houses in
1998. For municipalities with few transactions (5 or less) the
average price is replaced with a county average for
municipalities of the same size.
5.027 (1.538)
housing incl. Dummy variable equal to 1 if support to housing is included in
bn, 0 otherwise.
0.067 (0.25)
Minimum 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Maximum Average (st.dev.)
b 24.060 28.937 30.079 31.132 35.596 30.059 (1.650)
bn 2.258 3.540 3.930 4.335 6.441 3.969 (0.613)
b is expected welfare benefit per standard recipient per year in 1000 NOK and bn is welfare benefit norm for
single persons per month in 1000 NOK, N =433.
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Appendix C. Table A.3: Average welfare benefits, standard deviations and
coefficients of variation according to county
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Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices?  
Evidence from a Natural Experiment* 
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Abstract 
This paper studies how changes in welfare benefit levels affect welfare recipients’ residential 
choices. Although several empirical studies have stressed that welfare policy may affect 
residential choices of welfare recipients, few studies have taken into account that residential 
choices of welfare recipients also affect welfare policy. The main contribution of this paper is 
to address this policy endogeneity by utilizing a centrally implemented policy reform taking 
place in Norway as a natural experiment. The results are consistent with the presence of 
welfare migration effects. Moreover, I show that ignoring the policy endogeneity may give 
rise to a downward bias in the estimated migration responses. 
JEL classification: I38, H73, H77, R23; 
Keywords: Natural experiment, policy endogeneity, migration, welfare benefits. 
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1. Introduction
A large body of literature in public finance going back to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave (1959) 
has warned against the consequences of decentralized responsibility for redistribution due to 
household mobility. The basic argument is that policies that are redistributive in nature give 
rise to a phenomenon that resembles adverse selection: net beneficiaries of redistributive 
policies are attracted to generous jurisdictions, while net contributors are repelled. It follows 
that jurisdictions have incentives to behave strategically in their welfare policy to avoid 
becoming ‘welfare magnets’. Because the concern about welfare migration limits welfare 
provision in all jurisdictions, no jurisdiction succeeds in repelling welfare recipients and the 
equilibrium is characterized by all jurisdictions setting lower benefits than they would in the 
(hypothetical) no-mobility case (Wildasin, 1991).1 Such reasoning has lead Stigler and other 
scholars to the conclusion that “redistribution is intrinsically a national policy” (Stigler, 1957, 
p. 217). Another argument often posed in favor of centralized responsibility for redistribution 
is that the well-being of the poor is a national concern, i.e., a national public good (Brown and 
Oates, 1987). However, there are also potential benefits to reap from decentralized 
responsibility for redistribution. A decentralized system may for example be better able to 
tailor (appropriate) benefits to those that are truly in need and may be better for maintaining 
bureaucratic control.2 In designing a well-functioning public sector one needs to trade these 
potential benefits of decentralization with the welfare costs related to welfare migration. It 
follows that theoretical models that rely on different assumptions on household mobility (in 
response to fiscal parameters) are likely to have different implications for assignment of 
redistributive policy across different tiers of government. From a normative perspective then, 
it is interesting to evaluate whether welfare migration is important in practice. This is the 
object of the current analysis. Looking for evidence in favor of welfare migration, I aim to 
answer this question: Do jurisdictions that offer higher welfare benefits attract poor people 
who would not otherwise move there and retain poor people who might otherwise have 
chosen to leave? I refer to this as the ‘welfare migration hypothesis’.  
The existing literature on the welfare migration hypothesis is primarily based on cross-
sectional variation in welfare benefits across US states. The early studies have provided 
1 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as a ‘race to the bottom’ in welfare policy. This term is somewhat 
misleading since theoretical models of fiscal competition typically do not suggest an intense race to the bottom, 
but a general downward pressure on redistributive activity. 
2 These and other aspects are discussed in detail by Ladd and Doolittle (1982). 
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conflicting and inconclusive results as to whether welfare recipients respond to (changes in) 
welfare benefit levels by relocating. These studies are however plagued by several 
methodological problems, discussed by, for example, Bailey (2005), McKinnish (2005), and 
Meyer (2000). Some of the very recent studies on the welfare migration hypothesis have 
added to the welfare migration literature by applying more sophisticated identification 
strategies than previous studies and have confirmed the existence of welfare migration. Bailey 
(2005) stressed that many studies risk distorting the effect of welfare on migration decisions 
by inadequately accounting for attributes of the jurisdictions that affect migration. He 
demonstrates that some previous studies that failed to find any welfare migration effect 
suffered from specification errors. Applying a more rigorous estimation strategy than many 
previous analyses, in particular by including state fixed effects and a control group, which 
helped to soak up (unobserved) confounding factors, he found evidence in favor of the 
welfare migration hypothesis. Gelbach (2004) pointed out that the incentives to migrate for 
welfare benefits are highest when a mother’s children are young, as there is a longer period of 
welfare benefit eligibility in the US. He found that for single women with less than a college 
degree, their own state’s welfare benefits affected residential decisions and that effects were 
decreasing in the age of the oldest child. The interaction effect was not present for a 
comparison group of mothers with college degrees. McKinnish (2005, 2006) introduced 
another clever identification strategy. She compared welfare program size in border counties 
to interior counties within US states. The key assumption made is that costs of between-state 
migration are lower for individuals located close to state borders. It follows that it is 
reasonable to expect that at state borders with a large cross-border benefit differential, the 
border counties on the high (low) benefit side should have higher (lower) welfare 
participation relative to the interior counties of the high (low) benefit state. This is exactly 
what McKinnish (2005) found, utilizing aggregate county level data. Consistent results are 
found when micro level data on migration decisions are used (McKinnish, 2006).  
A closely related literature has focused on the strategic interaction among jurisdictions in the 
determination of welfare policy. If a jurisdiction is concerned about becoming a ‘welfare 
magnet’, then benefit levels in other (typically close by) jurisdictions will affect the 
jurisdiction’s own benefit choice. Evidence of strategic interaction in welfare policy among 
jurisdictions, i.e. welfare competition, thus provides indirect evidence that the welfare 
migration hypothesis is correct. Both US studies, summarized by Brueckner (2000), and 
European studies, such as Fiva and Rattsø (2006) studying Norwegian local governments, 
41
have found results consistent with the welfare competition hypothesis.3 Jurisdictions seem 
indeed to be playing a ‘welfare game’, suggesting that studies of welfare migration should 
pay close attention to policy endogeneity. Surprisingly, the existing literature does not follow 
this recommendation. Almost all existing studies rely purely on cross-sectional variation in 
welfare benefits to identify welfare migration effects. However, if welfare benefits affect 
residential decisions of the poor, then residential choices of the poor are likely to affect how 
benefit levels are set (Moffit, 1992). It follows that studies taking variation in welfare benefits 
as exogenous may obtain biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Since rational 
politicians are likely to respond to increased inflow of welfare recipients by lowering welfare 
benefits, a downward bias in studies that neglect this problem, such as Bailey (2005), Gelbach 
(2004), and McKinnish (2006), can be expected.4
The current paper adds to the welfare migration literature by evaluating aggregate migration 
flows of welfare recipients across local governments in Norway. The main contribution is to 
address the potential endogeneity problem by utilizing a centrally implemented policy reform 
as a natural experiment. More specifically, I utilize exogenous variation in welfare benefits 
across Norwegian local governments provided by an announcement of national guidelines 
taking place in 2001. The econometric analysis applies a conventional difference-in-
differences strategy in which I evaluate whether changes in welfare benefits are positively 
associated with changes in net inflow of welfare recipients relative to a control group. The 
results from the econometric analysis are consistent with the welfare migration hypothesis and 
more importantly, suggest that ignoring the policy endogeneity exerts a downward bias in the 
estimated welfare migration effect.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the institutional setting and 
the data set analyzed. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and discusses potential 
problems with earlier work. The results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
3 Note that it is empirically challenging to separate strategic interaction in welfare policy due to mobility 
pressure from other sources of strategic interaction (notably yardstick competition). Welfare competition may 
also occur if policy makers believe in the welfare migration hypothesis, even in the absence of conclusive 
evidence.  
4 Policy endogeneity is less likely to be a problem for McKinnish (2005a) since welfare migration effects are 
estimated by comparing welfare caseloads at state borders to state interiors, but this identification strategy only 
allows identification of short distance welfare migration effects. 
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2. Institutional Structure and Data 
While the existing literature on the welfare migration hypothesis has studied data from the 
US, the current analysis utilizes data from another country with decentralized welfare policy, 
Norway. The welfare benefit system is the final safety net for those who fall through the gaps 
of other arrangements of the Norwegian welfare system and is intended to provide temporary 
support to people in need. The Social Service Act represents the regulations in force and 
states criteria and guidelines for the welfare benefits granted by local governments. The 
Social Service Act leaves considerable discretion to local governments concerning the 
generosity of the system, regarding both eligibility and the level of the benefits.  
The local governments are democratic institutions led by an elected local council. Their main 
responsibilities concern preschool, primary and lower secondary education, and care for the 
elderly. Financing of local governments is highly centralized with around 90% of local 
government revenue coming from regulated income taxation and grants from the central 
government. Local governments have some discretion related to user charges and property 
taxation, which are important additional revenue sources on the margin. The grants are 
distributed as block grants and are based on objective criteria, partly as income tax 
equalization and partly as spending equalization. It follows that local governments do not face 
the full economic consequences of welfare migration.  
2.1. Welfare Benefits 
The implementation of welfare policies includes guidelines set by the local council and actual 
payments made by the welfare bureaucracy. The politically determined norms are defined as 
the amounts paid to ‘standard users’ per month. As emphasized by Fiva and Rattsø (2006), 
the link between politically determined norms and actual welfare payments is not trivial. The 
unique data set utilized by Fiva and Rattsø (2006) on actual payments for a ‘standardized 
household’ is only available for one year (1998). In this analysis I rely on the politically 
determined norms for single households to reflect welfare generosity. The politically 
determined norms are likely to be the most visible measure of welfare policy from the 
perspective of potential welfare immigrants and consequently appear well suited for a study 
of the welfare migration hypothesis.  
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Data on welfare benefit norms are available from 1993 onwards. However, there are quite a 
few observations missing from the two first years of data collection, and consequently I limit 
the analysis to the period 1995 to 2004. Appendix Table 1 shows the distribution of the 
locally determined norms for a single household per month, from 1995 through 2004.5 The 
politically determined norm varies considerably across local governments. Since housing 
costs are excluded from the politically determined norms, the observed variation in welfare 
benefits can hardly be attributed to differences in living costs. Nor can the variation in welfare 
benefits be explained by differences across other particular dimensions, such as differences 
between rural and urban local governments.6 The average welfare benefit norm to a single 
household was NOK 4203 (USD 700) per month in 2004.  
No national standard concerning how much welfare recipients should be granted in welfare 
benefits existed until 2001. In February 2001 the central government announced a national 
instructive welfare benefit norm, which can be understood as a response to the differences 
observed among local governments prior to 2001. The rationale for the instructive norm was 
to “contribute to a more homogenous practice across local governments and to provide more 
similar support for equal recipients” (Circular I-13/2001 from the central government, my 
translation). The coefficient of variation reported in Appendix Table 1 has decreased from 
around 0.15 prior to the announcement to around 0.10 thereafter. It is evident that the 
instructive norms have succeeded in making the locally determined norms more homogenous.  
2.2. Migration Rates 
Data on received social assistance are available for the entire adult Norwegian population. To 
provide a clean test of the welfare migration hypothesis I limit the data set to men aged 16 to 
66, without dependent children living in the same household. In each year this corresponds to 
approximately 810,000 people. It follows that about one sixth of the total Norwegian 
population is included in the data set (the total Norwegian population is approximately 4.5 
million). A welfare recipient is defined as a person receiving welfare benefits within a given 
year. Appendix Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics on welfare recipient status and 
migration rates. In the econometric analysis to be conducted I take a bird’s-eye perspective 
5 A total of 435 Norwegian local governments existed between 1995 and 2004. Due to a few missing variables 
and local government mergers I analyze a balanced panel of 430 local governments. 
6 Fiva and Rattsø (2006) find no statistically significant association between welfare benefits and population size 
and settlement pattern, controlling for other factors. 
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and evaluate overall migration flows to and from each local government. The key variable is 
then the net inflow of welfare recipients to each local government. The migration rates are 
measured as the proportion of people moving from one local government to another from 
January 1st in year t–1 to January 1st in year t.  
The proportion of welfare recipients in the sample varies from 6.9% to 8.3% between 1996 
and 2004. It follows that single men between 16 and 66 without dependent children are 
overrepresented as welfare recipients, since only 3% in the general population received 
welfare benefits during a given year. Since the welfare recipient population is quite 
heterogeneous it may be useful to distinguish between short- and long-term welfare 
recipients. Recipients that are in the welfare system for longer periods have stronger 
incentives to respond to changes in welfare generosity than the general population of welfare 
recipients. It is not clear where the line between ‘short-term recipient’ and ‘long-term 
recipient’ should be drawn. I suggest that people that received welfare benefits for at least 
four months within a given year be classified as long-term recipients. Although social 
assistance is intended to be granted in emergency situations and not as long-term support, the 
data indicate that several recipients have long periods of welfare dependence.7 Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of welfare recipients according to the number of months they received welfare 
benefits within a given year. The figures are based on averages from 1996 to 2004, but the 
distributions for each year are nearly identical.  Around 20% of the welfare recipients 
received welfare benefits for only one month; another 22% received welfare benefits for two 
or three months. This yields on average 42% short-term recipients and 58% long-term 
recipients according to my definition. Note that a recipient may have several welfare spells 
within a year and I do not distinguish between welfare recipients with several shorter welfare 
periods (of say one month each) and those with one longer welfare period. 
Figure 1 about here.  
Household mobility is generally considered to be higher in the US than within European 
countries. However, the proportion of people moving across local government lines in 
Norway is much higher than the corresponding proportion of people moving across US state 
7 Note also that around two out of three welfare recipients that received welfare benefits in year t also received 
welfare benefits in year t–1. Around half the welfare recipients that received welfare benefits in year t also 
received welfare benefits in year t–1 and year t+1.  
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lines. This follows from the fact that the average local government in Norway is much smaller 
in area than is the average US state. The average local government jurisdiction in Norway is 
approximately 700 km2, whereas the continental US states range from around 4,000 km2
(Rhode Island) to almost 700,000 km2 (Texas).  
Appendix Table 2 shows that around 13% of the welfare recipient population moved across 
local government lines from one year to the next compared to around 6–7% of the control 
group of nonrecipients.8 Labor economists have generally explained the greater mobility of 
the poor as a function of the relatively low opportunity costs of moving for those with low 
incomes (Peterson and Rom, 1990). Levine and Zimmerman, who also utilized US data to 
study the welfare migration hypothesis, distinguished between poor single mothers and four 
different control groups (poor single women without children, poor single men, poor married 
women, and poor married men). They find that “roughly 5–7.5% of the control group 
members are observed moving across state lines between one year and the next, compared to 
just under 4% of the treatment group members” (Levine and Zimmerman (1999, p. 401)).9 It 
follows that Norwegian single men without children receiving welfare are around three times 
as likely to move across jurisdiction lines as poor women with dependent children in the US. 
The treatment group members (never-married high school dropouts with children) in the 
McKinnish (2006) study are even less mobile: only 5–6% of them moved across state lines 
during a five-year period.  
3. Empirical Strategy 
If one is interested in the causal effect of changes in welfare policy on residential choices of 
welfare recipients, two key methodological issues must be addressed. First, unobserved 
factors that are correlated with changes in welfare policy may generate a spurious association 
between welfare policy and residential choices. Second, since policy makers are likely to take 
into account the migration responses of welfare recipients when deciding on welfare policy, 
cross-sectional variation in (changes in) welfare benefits is endogenous to the migration 
responses. While the first problem is properly addressed in the more recent studies of welfare 
8 A person is a welfare recipient if he received welfare benefits in year t–1, independent of whether he received 
welfare benefits in year t.  
9 Levine and Zimmerman (1999) found no evidence in favor of the welfare migration hypothesis. 
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migration, the second problem is typically ignored. In this section I discuss how both 
problems are addressed in the current study.  
3.1. The Difference-in-Differences Estimator 
The simplest test of the welfare migration hypothesis imaginable would be to investigate 
whether there is a positive correlation between changes in welfare generosity and net inflow 
of recipients from one year to the next. However, since people move for any number of 
pecuniary or nonpecuniary reasons, any sensible model of welfare migration cannot rely on 
changes in welfare benefits as the sole determinant of migration. If for example regional 
economic shocks altered both migration patterns and welfare generosity, this would confound 
the estimates. In order to take account of such problems one can use a group of similar people 
as a control group. A valid control group allows me to take into account factors unrelated to 
changes in welfare benefits. Technically this difference-in-differences approach facilitates this 
by adjusting changes in migration flows of welfare recipients (the treatment group) by 
changes in migration flows of nonrecipients (the control group). The central idea is that 
changes in welfare generosity will affect residential location of welfare recipients while 
leaving other people unaffected. In the econometric analysis I divide the sample into two 
groups, welfare recipients (the treatment group) and nonrecipients (the control group).10 I 
condition on welfare receipt in year t–1 to reduce the possibility that endogenous welfare 
participation (correlation of welfare participation and welfare benefits) creates a spurious 
relationship between welfare policy and residential location.11 I have also estimated the 
model, conditioning on welfare recipient status in year t, and the results are similar. This is 
comforting and suggests that endogenous welfare participation is not confounding the 
estimates. 
10 I also check how excluding short-term welfare recipients from the treatment group affects the estimates. The 
left-hand side variable in Eq. (1) below is then replaced with: ǻnet_inflow_long_recipients-ǻnet_inflow_control( )
Population in 10 000s
.
11 If some people do not receive welfare payments in low-benefit states but would if they were in a high-benefit 
state, conditioning on welfare receipt in year t is likely to exaggerate the flow of welfare recipients from low- to 
high-benefit jurisdictions. Conditioning on welfare receipt in period t–1 would reduce the problem, but bias 
could still exist and would most likely go against finding evidence of welfare migration (Meyer, 2000). 
Conditioning on welfare receipt in period t–1 is also likely to exhibit a downward bias if a substantial number of 
poor people who are not on welfare in period t–1 (and are consequently assigned to the control group) migrate to 
other local governments to receive welfare benefits. 
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The main regression to be estimated is given by: 
1 2 it-1 3 it-1
ǻnet_inflow_recipients-ǻnet_inflow_control( ) Benefits Unemployment
Population in 10 000s it it
uG G G  '  '  , (1) 
where  
ǻnet_inflow_recipientsit = (inflows of recipientsit – outflows of recipientsit)
    – (inflows of recipientsit-1 – outflows of recipientsit–1),
and
ǻnet_inflow_controlit = (inflows of nonrecipientsit – outflows of nonrecipientsit)
   – (inflows of nonrecipientsit–1 – outflows of nonrecipientsit–1).
ǻBenefitsit–1 is the change in the politically determined norm granted to a single person per 
month in NOK 1000 from year t–2 to year t–1.12 ǻBenefits is lagged one period because the 
change in benefits from year t–1 to year t cannot (technically) have an impact on the 
migration flows observed from t–1 to t, since migration rates are measured as net inflows 
from January 1st in year t–1 to January 1st in year t. The welfare migration hypothesis suggests 
that 2G  > 0.
As discussed above, the central idea in the difference-in-differences estimator is that the 
control group and the treatment group face many of the same migration incentives. However, 
to capture that economic conditions do not necessarily influence treatment and comparison 
groups in the same way, I include ǻunemployment as a control variable. Unemployment is 
defined as the share of the male population that is unemployed (yearly average). 3G  captures 
the differential effect of changes in unemployment rates on the treatment and control 
population. Utilizing US data, Bailey (2005) finds that the welfare population is less repelled 
by high unemployment, suggesting that 3 0G ! .
                                                
12 I have also experimented with utilizing the percentage change in welfare benefits as an independent variable. 
The results are then similar, but in most specifications the fit is worse than when I use absolute changes.  
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3.2. Handling the Policy Endogeneity 
If welfare-induced migration is a concern for policy makers, then ǻBenefits is endogenous to 
the left-hand side variable in Eq. (1). If this is the case, then estimating Eq. (1) with Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) would give rise to biased and inconsistent estimates. It is reasonable to 
argue that if the welfare population is increasing, policy makers will be inclined to reduce 
benefit levels. Utilizing a natural experiment (exogenous placement of refugees across 
Swedish municipalities) Dahlberg and Edmark (2004) find that policy makers in fact respond 
to increases in the welfare population by reducing welfare benefits. Gelbach’s (2004) 
simulation results with US data also suggest that welfare migration depresses optimal state 
benefit levels. It follows that policy endogeneity is likely to result in a negative bias in 2G
when estimating Eq. (1) with standard OLS. This problem is not properly addressed in the 
existing literature. While most studies have simply ignored policy endogeneity, Peterson and 
Rom (1989, 1990) and Berry et al. (2003) acknowledged the problem and addressed it by 
simultaneously estimating the mutual effects of welfare benefits and poverty rates, but the 
exclusion restrictions that they imposed to obtain identification are questionable.13
Without the ability to experimentally vary the relevant variable (welfare generosity) this paper 
follows the recommendation of Meyer and seeks “variation that is driven by factors that are 
clearly identified and understood” (1995, p. 153). I suggest that the introduction of national 
guidelines in Norway, discussed in Section 3.2, can act as a natural experiment that allows me 
to obtain exogenous variation in ǻBenefitsi. This approach facilitates a credible test of the 
welfare migration hypothesis, and potential bias in work that neglects policy endogeneity can 
be investigated.14
The policy reform can be thought of as generating instruments that can be used to identify 
causal effects. To take advantage of the exogenous variation that the policy reform generates, 
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach is warranted. Since the policy reform was 
implemented at one point in time, this identification strategy reduces the data set from a panel 
data set of eight years of observations to a simple cross-section for 2002. The underlying 
assumption for the applied identification strategy is that the national guidelines launched in 
                                                
13 E.g., Berry et al. (2003) exclude the private income level from the welfare benefit equation. This is 
problematic if redistribution to the poor is driven by altruism (which suggests a positive association between 
income level and welfare benefits). 
14 Meyer (1995) provides an insightful discussion of the issues surrounding natural experiments. 
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February 2001 had a direct impact on local government priorities. This is also what the data 
shows. In a survey conducted in August 2001, 104 out of 336 local governments15 claimed 
that they had altered the welfare benefit levels after the national guidelines were announced. 
Of the local governments, 78 (19) claimed that they had changed their welfare benefits 
exclusively (partially) due to the announcement. In the current data set, 119 out of the 430 
local governments chose to implement the national guidelines in 2001. 
To capture the impact of the national guidelines I divide the local governments into five 
groups according to their welfare benefit levels in 2000 (the year prior to the policy reform). 
The division is based on how far the local governments were from the central guidelines to be 
launched the following year:  
- Group 1: More than NOK 500 below the guidelines (11% of all local governments). 
- Group 2: Below the guidelines, but by less than NOK 500 (27% of all local 
governments). 
- Group 3: Above the guidelines, but by less than NOK 500 (31% of all local 
governments). 
- Group 4: More than NOK 500 above the guidelines, but less than NOK 1000 (18% of 
all local governments). 
- Group 5: More than NOK 1000 above the guidelines (13% of all local governments). 
I expect the local governments that had welfare benefits below the national guidelines (NOK 
3880) in 2000 to be more inclined to increase their welfare benefits relative to local 
governments that had welfare benefits above the national guidelines, and I expect this effect 
to be dependent on the distance to the central guidelines. To capture this I introduce 10 
instrumental variables: five group dummies for each of the groups above and five interaction 
terms between the group dummies and the distance to the central guidelines. It follows that 
the first-stage regression in the 2SLS consists of regressing i2001Benefits'  on these 10 
instrumental variables and i2001Unemployment' . The validity of this identification strategy 
rests on the assumption that local governments’ welfare benefit levels in 2000 had no impact 
on the change in net inflows of welfare recipients (relative to the control group) in the 
following year, except through the impact on the change in welfare benefits.  
                                                
15 A total of 98 local governments did not respond.  
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4. Results 
Looking into the Norwegian data on welfare policy and residential choices I start by 
providing a descriptive analysis of how the national guidelines affected overall migration 
rates. I then move on to the direct test of the welfare migration hypothesis, drawing on the 
identification strategy laid out in Section 3, before I discuss whether the estimated welfare 
migration effects are likely to be an important concern for policy makers.
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
The national guidelines launched in 2001 had two basic effects on local government priorities. 
First, the guidelines made the locally determined norms more homogenous. The coefficient of 
variation decreased from approximately 0.15 in the period prior to the guidelines to around 
0.1 in the period after the guidelines (see Appendix Table 1). Second, the introduction of the 
guidelines in 2001 was associated with a drop in the raw correlation of welfare benefits 
between two consecutive years. Looking for evidence in favor of the welfare migration 
hypothesis I start out by evaluating whether the centrally implemented reform is associated 
with any changes in overall migration rates. If the welfare migration hypothesis is correct, 
then the introduction of the guidelines would have an impact on migration patterns of welfare-
prone households for two reasons. In the short run the average incentives to move should have 
increased because several local governments radically altered their welfare benefit norms, and 
in the longer run incentives to move should be reduced due to more homogenous welfare 
benefits. Nonrecipients should be unaffected by the central government guidelines. 
Interestingly, as Figure 2 shows, the proportion of welfare recipients that moved across local 
government borders peaked in 2001–2002. The same finding holds when controlling for the 
migration rates of nonrecipients, but to a lesser extent. If welfare migrations typically are 
short distance moves, which McKinnish (2006) finds to be the case in the US, one would 
expect that migration rates across local government lines within counties to be particularly 
sensitive to the centrally implemented policy reform. Figure 3, which emphasizes within-
county migration flows, exhibits the same pattern as Figure 2. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here.  
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Since welfare benefits became more homogenous after the introduction of the central 
guidelines, one would expect welfare migration to decline after the initial ‘shock’ taking place 
in 2001–2002. In 2002–2003 this argument is indeed supported by the data illustrated in 
Figure 2 and 3. However, somewhat puzzlingly, the migration rate increases in 2003–2004.  
To further investigate whether welfare recipients actually moved more following the 
implementation of the national instructive norms I evaluate within-county mobility in 
Norway’s 18 counties. Equation (2) shows the simple regression to be estimated: 
it it 2(Mobility_Recipients -Mobility_NonRecipients ) i t it itf unemploymentW E H    , (2) 
where the dependent variable is the difference in within-county migration rates of welfare 
recipients and non-recipients, in county i at time t. On the right-hand side I include time 
specific fixed effects tW  and county specific fixed effects, if . Since regional economic shocks 
may affect welfare recipients and nonrecipients differently, I include the lagged 
unemployment rate as an explanatory variable.  
The results are presented in Table 1. The coefficient of interest is related to the 2002 dummy, 
which, all else equal, is expected to be positive according to the welfare migration hypothesis. 
In specification (1) I fail to find any statistically significant effect of any of the year dummies, 
including the dummy for 2002. As a further test, I impose the restriction that the impacts of 
all other dummies except one are set to be zero. This is reported in specifications (2) to (9). 
None of the dummies for the period prior to the policy reform turns out statistically 
significant, while the dummies for 2002, 2003, and 2004 come out statistically significant.  
Table 1 about here.  
As discussed above, two effects of the policy reform on overall migration rates of welfare 
recipients are to be expected. There is a short-term effect (positive) and a long-term effect 
(negative). The cleanest test of the welfare migration hypothesis is therefore to evaluate only 
the 2002 dummy where only the former effect can be present. The data shows that in 
comparison to other years, the difference in migration rates between recipients and 
nonrecipients within counties were on average 0.3% higher in 2002. This effect holds when 
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studying either the entire period available (specification (7)) or only the period up to the 
reform (specification (10)). This is evidence supporting the welfare migration hypothesis. 
4.2. The Direct Test of the Welfare Migration Hypothesis 
As discussed above, it may be highly problematic to rely on simple cross-sectional variation 
in changes in welfare benefits to identify welfare migration effects. To identify welfare 
migration effects one needs variation in welfare policy that can reasonably be treated as 
exogenous. The empirical strategy followed here is to utilize cross-sectional variation in 
changes in welfare benefits generated by the introduction of national guidelines launched in 
2001. To establish this variation I estimate a first-stage regression where changes in welfare 
benefit levels from 2000 to 2001 are regressed on variables indicating the distance from the 
central guidelines (to be launched in 2001) in 2000. The first-stage regression is reported in 
Table 2.
Table 2 about here.  
The F-test for joint significance of the excluded instruments suggests that the instruments do 
not suffer from the problems related to weak instruments (with an F-value of 19.86). As 
expected, local governments with welfare benefits below the central guidelines for 2001 are 
predicted to have increased their welfare benefits from 2000 to 2001, and to a greater extent 
the further they were from the central guidelines. The local governments above the central 
guidelines were predicted to reduce their welfare benefits and to some extent they were more 
likely to do this the further they were from the central guidelines. However, the effect is not 
symmetric for local governments above and below the guidelines. Local governments above 
the central guidelines seem to have been less inclined to conform to the national guidelines 
than those below the central guidelines. The discrepancy is best illustrated graphically. In 
Figure 4 actual welfare benefit levels in 2000 are on the horizontal axis, while predicted 
values for the change in welfare benefits from 2000 to 2001 are on the vertical axis. For 
comparison, Figure 5 shows the actual changes in welfare benefits relative to welfare benefit 
levels in 2000. The linear curve that can be spotted in Figure 5 corresponds to the 119 local 
governments that conformed to the central guidelines.  
Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here.  
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The main results are presented in Table 3. As a benchmark for evaluating the potential 
endogeneity problem I include results from an OLS regression on Eq. (1) based on panel data 
for the period prior to the introduction of the central guidelines (1997–2001). In this sample 
no welfare migration effect can be found (specification (12)). However, when constraining the 
sample to the cross section when the central guidelines were launched and replacing actual 
values for ǻBenefits with fitted values from the first-stage regression, I find solid welfare 
migration effects, statistically significant at the 5% level.16 No impact of the lagged 
unemployment rate is found. 17, 18
The welfare migration effect is not only statistically significant, but also economically 
important. The point estimate of 18.69 suggests that an increase in welfare benefit levels of 
NOK 1000 is associated with an inflow of approximately 19 welfare recipients from the 
subpopulation under study for a local government with 10,000 inhabitants (an average 
Norwegian local government). A local government with 10,000 inhabitants will have around 
1700 men, without children, between 16–66 years of age and on average, around 7% of them 
will be welfare recipients. It follows that this subpopulation of welfare recipients will increase 
by around 16%.  
In Appendix Table 3 I report OLS cross-section regressions for each year. The estimated 
welfare migration effects exhibit considerable variation from year to year. Interestingly, the 
cross-section regression for 2002 is the only regression with a statistically significant positive 
welfare migration effect at the 5% level (although the cross-section regression for 2000 comes 
close). One possible interpretation of this finding is that the bias in the OLS estimates due to 
policy endogeneity is smaller in the 2002 cross section because many local governments 
                                                
16 In preliminary work I have also experimented with a more parsimonious first-stage specification in which I 
used only two group dummies (above and below NOK 3880) and their interaction with the distance to the central 
guidelines. This specification provides a somewhat lower fit of the first-stage regression (R2adj of 0.271). With 
the more parsimonious first-stage, the estimated welfare migration effects in the second stage are lower (around 
10) and the standard errors are larger. There is no longer any statistically significant effect of ǻBenefitsit-1 (with 
p-values of around 0.2).  
17 Note that since the lagged change in unemployment may be endogenous to the left-hand side and therefore 
problematic as a control variable, I have run all specifications without this variable and this basically does not 
alter the impact of ǻBenefitsit-1.
18 Increasing welfare benefits have two effects on migration flows: attracting people from other local 
governments and retaining the welfare population that is already living in the local government area. Reductions 
in welfare benefits will work exactly oppositely. The repelling and attracting forces may not necessarily be 
symmetric and may also manifest over different time spans. I have investigated whether the repelling effect is 
stronger than the attracting effect (or vice versa) but I have not found such an asymmetric welfare migration 
effect in the data. 
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mechanically adjusted their welfare benefit levels in line with the national guidelines from 
2000 to 2001.  
Since welfare recipients that are more dependent on welfare benefits may respond more to 
differences in welfare benefits, I run another set of regressions in which I exclude short-term 
recipients from the sample. The treatment group only consists of welfare recipients that 
received welfare benefits in at least four months in year t–1. Table 4 reports the results, which 
are basically a reproduction of the results in Table 3. The welfare migration effect is solid and 
close to being statistically significant at the 10% level when the policy endogeneity is 
properly handled. There is some evidence that the welfare migration effect is larger for long-
term recipients than for short-term recipients. Of the welfare recipients, 42% are short-term 
recipients, but comparing specification (15) to specification (13) the point estimate is reduced 
by considerably less than 42%.   
Table 4 about here.  
Tables 5 and 6 reproduce Tables 3 and 4, respectively, but consider only short distance 
moves. Short distance moves are defined as migrations across local government lines within 
counties. The point estimates are again positive and borderline statistically significant (p-
values of 0.072 and 0.101). Even though long distance migrations constitute 60% of all 
migrations, excluding those migrations do not reduce the point estimate from specifications 
(13) and (15) by more than 25% and 9%, respectively. This suggests that most of the welfare 
migration effect is driven by welfare recipients migrating between jurisdictions that are close 
together. Clearly, the definition of short distance migrations applied here is quite crude. A 
more sophisticated specification, for example migrations defined as moves no longer than a 
given number of kilometers, is likely to provide a superior specification. Thus, these results 
seem to suggest that short distance migration flows generate most of the welfare migration 
effect.
4.3. Is Welfare Migration Likely to be a Concern for Policy Makers? 
The results above show that changes in welfare benefits exert a nontrivial effect on residential 
choices of welfare recipients. However, one may question whether this migratory response is 
perceived by local policy makers and whether policy makers react by holding benefit levels 
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below what they otherwise would be. Gelbach (2004) and McKinnish (2006) argue that this is 
probably not the case. Although they find that differences in welfare generosity generate 
substantial changes in the migration rates of welfare-prone households, they argue that even 
sizeable differences in migration rates do not generate particularly large migration flows 
because welfare-prone individuals in the US are a relatively immobile group. They conclude 
that welfare migration is unlikely to be a large concern of policy makers. The current study 
evaluates welfare migration in another country with decentralized responsibility for welfare 
policy, Norway. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, a bias in estimates that ignores the 
policy endogeneity is found. Hence, the conclusions of the current analysis stand in contrast 
to that of Gelbach (2004) and McKinnish (2006). If welfare migration were of no concern to 
policy makers, the standard OLS estimates would not be biased.  
To see why it is reasonable for policy makers to worry about welfare magnetism, consider the 
following stylized example based on the results presented above. An average local 
government consisting of 10,000 inhabitants and 3% welfare recipients considers increasing 
its welfare benefits from NOK 4000 to NOK 4500 for all types of welfare recipients. In the 
no-mobility case, the cost of such a policy would simply be the increase in welfare benefits 
times the number of recipients living in the jurisdiction (NOK500*300 = NOK150,000). 
However when welfare recipients respond to changes in welfare benefits by relocating, the 
cost of welfare generosity increases because the jurisdictions’ welfare recipient population 
increases. According to the most general 2SLS specification (specification (13)), a NOK 500 
increase would lead to a net inflow of approximately nine welfare recipients from the 
subpopulation under study the following year (0.5*18.69). This corresponds to a 7.5% 
increase in the welfare recipient population under study.19 Assuming that other welfare 
recipients groups (single women, families, etc.) react in similar fashion to changes in welfare 
benefit levels, then the cost of increasing welfare benefits with NOK 500 become: NOK 
500*300 current recipients + NOK 4500*22.5 new recipients = NOK 251,250 per month. The 
cost is 67% higher than if welfare recipients do not respond to changes in welfare benefits and 
is certainly likely to be a concern for policy makers. The welfare migration cost may be 
exaggerated if, for example, households with children respond less to changes in welfare 
benefits. However, assuming that the migration response of all other households except single 
men 16–66 years of age without dependent children is equal to zero still suggests that the cost 
                                                
19 An average local government will have approximately 1700 men aged 16–66 without children, where around 
120 (7%) are welfare recipients. 
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of increasing welfare benefits from NOK 4000 to NOK 4500 is 27% higher than it would be 
in the absence of welfare migration. Although the confidence interval of the estimate driving 
this result admittedly is quite large, the results in this analysis suggest that welfare migration 
is likely to be a concern for policy makers. This is consistent with the strong strategic 
interaction in welfare policy found among Norwegian local governments by Fiva and Rattsø 
(2006). 
5. Conclusion 
With closer EU integration some economists and policy makers are worried that increased 
mobility of people, goods, and factors of production may release competitive forces leading to 
a roll back of social standards and welfare state arrangements. Countries have incentives to 
improve their relative position through successive undercutting of tax rates and welfare state 
arrangements, thereby attracting productive mobile production factors and deterring 
immigrants that impose a negative fiscal impact on the government budget. How important 
migration of welfare prone households is in Europe is not obvious, because cross-country 
mobility of households is fairly low and because EU rules have been designed to prevent this 
form of ‘social mobility’ by making free mobility contingent on employment (Andersen, 
2003).  
The current paper deals with the welfare migration hypothesis in a setting where household 
mobility is much higher than across European country lines and where there exist no rules to 
prevent this form of migration. Mobility across jurisdiction lines with responsibility for 
welfare policy in the country under study—Norway—is also considerably higher than in the 
US. Consequently, if welfare migration is important, it should be obvious in Norway. The 
current analysis exploits a natural experiment taking place in Norway to investigate the 
welfare migration hypothesis and finds supportive evidence. In particular, there seems to be a 
downward bias in regular OLS estimates that ignores the inherent policy endogeneity. The 
welfare migration responses are of a magnitude that suggests that local government policy 
makers are likely to worry about ‘welfare magnetism’ and fiscal competition in welfare policy 
is likely to prevail. As is well known from the theoretical literature, this may result in an 
equilibrium characterized by suboptimal levels of redistribution. Although this is not 
necessarily the case in Norway (due to the centralized financing of the local governments), 
this paper suggests that the main argument against decentralized responsibility for 
57
redistribution is not merely a theoretical possibility. Rather this argument seems highly 
relevant in settings similar to the one analyzed by the current paper. The importance of 
welfare migration in settings where household mobility is lower than across local government 
borders in Norway, such as between European countries, is a topic that should be addressed in 
future research.  
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Figure 4
Welfare benefit levels in 2000 (horizontal axis) and predicted changes in welfare benefit 
levels from 2000 to 2001 from the first-stage regression (vertical axis). Welfare benefit levels 
are measured in 1000 NOK. 
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Figure 5
Welfare benefit levels in 2000 (horizontal axis) and actual changes in welfare benefit levels 
from 2000 to 2001 (vertical axis). Welfare benefit levels are measured in 1000 NOK. 
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Table 2 
First-stage regression: dependent variable is ǻBenefits (–1) 
 (11) 
 Coeff. St. error 
Group1          (Benefits<3380) 0.27 0.20 
Group2          (3380<Benefits<3880) –0.01 0.05 
Group3          (3880<Benefits<4380) 0.00 0.06 
Group4          (4380<Benefits<4880) –0.15 0.19 
Group5          (Benefits>4880) –0.73 0.15 
Group1*distance 0.16 0.27 
Group2*distance 0.71 0.21 
Group3*distance –0.18 0.21 
Group4*distance 0.07 0.27 
Group5*distance 0.29 0.11 
ǻUnemployment (–1) 0.06 0.05 
R2adj 0.324 
Number of observations 430 
Sample 2002 
Estimation method OLS 
Table 3 
Dependent variable is ǻnet_inflow_recipients-ǻnet_inflow_control( )
Population in 10 000s
, all recipients are included. 
 (12) (13) 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
ǻbenefits (–1) –0.53 3.54 18.69 8.68 
ǻunemployment (–1) 2.73 3.54 2.91 7.99 
R2adj 0.000 0.008 
Number of observations 2150 430 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes 
Sample 1997–2001 2002 
Treatment group All recipients All recipients 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 
Note: Standard errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity.  
Table 4 
Dependent variable is ǻnet_inflow_long_recipients-ǻnet_inflow_control( )
Population in 10 000s
, only long-term recipients are 
included. 
 (14) (15) 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
ǻbenefits (–1) 0.07 3.37 13.73 8.63 
ǻunemployment (–1) 5.82 3.62 3.77 7.65 
R2adj 0.004 0.005 
Number of observations 2150 430 
Time fixed effects Yes No 
Sample 1997–2001 2002 
Treatment group Long-term recipients Long-term recipients 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 
Note: Standard errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 5 
Dependent variable is ǻnet_inflow_recipients-ǻnet_inflow_control( )
Population in 10 000s
, only within-county migration, all 
recipients are included. 
 (16) (17) 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
ǻbenefits (–1) 0.56 2.17 14.02 7.79 
ǻunemployment (–1) –1.72 2.12 0.61 5.86 
R2adj 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 2150 430 
Time fixed effects Yes No 
Sample 1997–2001 2002 
Treatment group All recipients All recipients 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 
Note: Standard errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity.  
Table 6 
Dependent variable is ǻnet_inflow_long_recipients-ǻnet_inflow_control( )
Population in 10 000s
, only within-county migration, 
only long-term recipients are included. 
 (18) (19) 
  Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error 
ǻbenefits (–1) 0.59 2.17 12.44 7.59 
ǻunemployment (–1) –0.39 2.29 1.02 5.49 
R2adj 0.004 0.000 
Number of observations 2150 430 
Time fixed effects Yes No 
Sample 1997–2001 2002 
Treatment group Long-term recipients Long-term recipients 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS 
Note: Standard errors are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity.  
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Local Choice of Property Taxation:  
Evidence from Norway*
Jon H. Fiva and Jørn Rattsø 
Abstract 
Decentralization of government with property tax financing is the standard recipe for public 
sector reform. Property taxation involves an incentive mechanism that is assumed to stimulate 
efficiency. We study the local choice of having property taxation in a setting where local 
governments can choose not to have property tax. The empirical analysis addresses whether 
political control problems motivate the choice of having property taxation. The local choice is 
investigated in an econometric model allowing for yardstick competition. The results indicate 
that political fragmentation motivates property taxation to control common pool problems. 
Yardstick competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in local property taxation. The 
main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.  
JEL classification: C11, C21, D78, H71;  
Keywords: property taxation, yardstick competition, political fragmentation, Bayesian 
analysis, spatial autoregressive model. 
* We appreciate financing from the Norwegian Research Council and comments on an earlier version from 
participants at the Research Workshop on Political Economy at Harvard University and at the 61st congress of 
the International Institute of Public Finance, in particular from Mark Schelker. We also thank Garth Holloway, 
Donald Lacombe and Tim Thomas for helpful discussions concerning the Bayesian analysis.
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1. Introduction 
Control problems and rigidities in public sector service provision have motivated search for 
incentive mechanisms to stimulate cost efficiency. Decentralization to local governments with 
property taxation is the standard World Bank - IMF advice to developing and transition 
economies (re)forming the public sector. De Mello (2004) summarizes the arguments and the 
cross-country evidence. Property taxation links public sector performance to government 
revenue via property values, and this feed back loop may serve as a discipline device. 
Property taxation also may raise popular control of politicians because it represents a direct 
and visible influence on the private economy of the inhabitants. Since most countries have 
property taxation for all of decentralized government, there is no control group to identify the 
incentive effect of the tax. We offer an alternative and indirect empirical evaluation of 
property taxation. 
Local governments in Norway can choose to have property taxation or not. Our approach is to 
investigate whether the local choice is affected by political control problems, notably party 
fragmentation. Previous studies have shown that party fragmentation leads to excessive and 
inefficient government. Local governments with fragmentation can possibly reduce this 
problem by having property taxation. The results confirm that the use of property taxation 
reflects political fragmentation and our interpretation is that property tax incentives matter. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1978, 1980) introduced the design of tax systems as incentive 
mechanism. Their main approach is the control of' 'Leviathan' government, but they also 
discuss incentives of public service provision. In particular they show how governments are 
stimulated to supply public services when the tax base is complementary to the provision of 
the public services. The more recent literature on tax incentives have concentrated on property 
taxation. Oates (2001) summarizes the arguments that property taxes facilitate efficient local 
fiscal decision-making. When property taxation can help control government officials, 
property taxation will be more desired the larger the imperfections of the political decision 
making process. We expect that voters will be more eager to have property taxation when the 
political system is inefficient. In the tradition of Roubini and Sachs (1989), the main source of 
fiscal inefficiencies is political fragmentation. Perotti and Kontoupolos (2002) offer an 
updated evaluation of fragmented government. The stylized fact is that political fragmentation 
leads to excessive spending and fiscal imbalance. This literature leaves an open question what 
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voters do to overcome the consequences of political fragmentation. Redesign of political 
institutions is a possibility. But since this is cumbersome and hard to do, it seems natural to 
look for alternative mechanisms. We relate the decision to have property tax to the degree of 
political fragmentation in the local government. 
Given the ‘Leviathan’ government challenge and the favorable characteristics of the property 
tax, it is of interest to analyze how local governments evaluate property taxation. Our 
approach is inspired by the literature on positive analysis of tax structure. Inman (1989) 
introduce a political economy model of the local decision to tax. Hettich and Winer (1999) 
more broadly advocate the understanding of tax structure as a political equilibrium. We 
include their emphasis on political characteristics, since this is important for the functioning 
of property taxes as an incentive mechanism to control government. We extend their 
frameworks by embedding the analysis in a spatial interaction model. 
The local choice of having property taxation is possibly influenced by the choices of 
neighboring municipalities and this interdependency must be taken into account in a complete 
positive model of local taxation. Wilson and Wildasin (2004) offer a recent overview of fiscal 
competition and with discussion of the empirical literature. We read the empirical studies as 
an overwhelming support of the existence of strategic interaction at the local government 
level, and that both tax base mobility and information asymmetries may be of importance. In 
our setting, since property taxation relates to immobile factors, yardstick competition is the 
most realistic form of fiscal competition. Empirical studies of relevance typically point to 
yardstick competition as the most likely source of strategic interaction among local 
governments. The analysis addresses the econometric challenges of spatial models with 
discrete dependent variables. 
Section 2 presents the empirical context and the data. The empirical approach is discussed in 
section 3 and section 4 presents our econometric strategy. The discrete choice to have 
property taxation (probit analysis) is analyzed in section 5, while section 6 expands the 
analysis to look at the revenue generation (tobit analysis). Section 7 offers concluding 
remarks. 
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2. Local Property Taxation in Norway 
Local governments in Norway can choose to have residential property taxation. The financing 
of the local governments is highly centralized, and more than 80% of the revenues are 
generated from central government grants and regulated income taxes. The grants are 
distributed as block grants and are based on objective criteria, partly as tax equalization and 
partly as spending equalization. The income tax revenue is shared between local, county and 
central governments with the maximum income tax rate at the local level set by the central 
government. All local governments apply the maximum income tax rate and their grants and 
income tax revenue consequently appear as given from above. Local governments have some 
discretion in setting fees for infrastructure services and welfare services, but also the fees are 
regulated and with the general rule that they can only cover costs. Borge (1995) and Borge 
and Rattsø (2005) analyze the fee setting, and Carlsen et al. (2005) investigate the role of 
mobility for the determination of fees for infrastructure services. The choice of having 
property tax is the key local decision to tax. Borge and Rattsø (2004) analyze determinants of 
the tax structure, the mix of revenues from property taxation and fees. We will have a closer 
look at the discrete choice of having property tax. 
The property tax is defined by law (of June 6, 1975) and the decision to have the tax is fully 
in the hands of the local government. The law describes the property that can be taxed, the tax 
base assessment, and restrictions to the tax rate. Residential property taxation is restricted to 
urban areas, that is towns and areas under construction that will appear as towns. This 
definition of an urban area is not very clear, and there are many court cases where property 
owners have argued that the area under taxation is not urban.  
Local governments in Norway are heterogeneous with respect to population size, with many 
small municipalities up valleys and along fjords. The median municipality has about 4.500 
inhabitants, while the average is a population of 10.000. Since we study the choice of having 
property tax, we exclude local governments that cannot have property tax because they have 
no urban areas. We set the cut off point to 2.500 inhabitants and exclude local governments 
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with population below this. Given the 434 local governments in all in 2001, we apply data for 
301 local governments, and 105 of them levy residential property taxation.1
All local governments have an assessment of house values related to the income tax. The 
assessment value is on average about 30% of the market value. The locals differ in their 
assessment, although most of them have assessed values in the area of 15-40% of market 
value. In addition to differences in the assessment practice, there are also variations in 
deductions (14 out of 108 local governments use different forms of deductions). The property 
tax rate is restricted to the interval 0.2% and 0.7% of the assessed housing value. 74 of the 
108 local governments with property taxation apply the maximum rate, and the average tax-
rate is 0.61%. In addition to the residential property tax about 120 other local governments 
have a commercial property tax. This is basically a tax on electric power stations and part of a 
system of distributing the resource rent of electricity based on waterfalls. The commercial 
property tax is excluded here. 
Our main focus concerns the existence of residential property taxation, but in an extension we 
will look at the determination of property tax revenue. Based on survey data we calculate how 
much a standardized household will have to pay in property taxation in each local government 
levying residential property taxation. The standardized house is assumed to be 160 sq. meters 
with a market value of NOK 1 million (USD 160 000). The average effective tax for the 
standardized house is NOK 1820 (USD 290), varying from NOK 4312  to NOK 130. A 
majority of the local governments (57 out of 108) levy effective taxes between NOK 1001 
and NOK 2000.  
3.  Empirical Modeling 
We study a situation where local governments can choose to have property taxation or not. 
Our main approach is to study this as a discrete choice between two alternatives: with and 
without the tax. The dummy variable dptax is our dependent variable, and dptax = 1 when the 
local government has residential property taxation. In an extension we will look at 
determinants of property tax revenue (ptax). 
1 The cut off at 2.500 inhabitants seems to work well as a general criterion and only 3 local governments with 
property taxation are excluded (see Appendix Table 1). The capital Oslo is excluded and data for two local 
governments are missing. 
77
   
In the conventional understanding of the role of taxation, the benefits of the increased public 
services financed by the new tax must be evaluated against the costs of raising the new 
revenue. Local governments choosing not to have property taxation are allowed higher private 
consumption and lower public consumption compared to those with property taxation. A 
standard fiscal demand model of the decision to levy property taxation emphasize two 
economic determinants, the private income level (y ) and the central government grants (G), 
both measured per capita. The private income level also works as a proxy for the property tax 
base here, since data about property valuation at the local level are not available. Consistent 
with the many studies of local public choice in the Scandinavian countries, we include the 
socialist share of the local council (SOC) as a measure of ideological orientation. Socialist 
oriented municipalities tend to have higher tax and spending levels.  
The first extension of this standard demand understanding is fiscal competition whereby the 
choice of property taxation in one municipality depends on choices in other municipalities. 
We concentrate on yardstick competition implying that voters make use of information about 
the political choices in neighboring local governments. The decisions of the neighbors carry 
an information externality, they represent information to evaluate the performance of own 
government. It follows that voters condition their electoral choices on the relative fiscal 
performance of their own versus neighboring local governments. The understanding of the 
mechanism was first developed by Salmon (1987) and formalized by Besley and Case (1995). 
Econometric studies of fiscal competition tend to indicate that yardstick competition is the 
most relevant form (Allers and Elhorst, 2005, provide an overview).  
We are aware of three different studies of strategic interaction in property tax decisions that 
try to separate yardstick competition from competition for a mobile tax base. Bordignon et al. 
(2003) find that business property tax interdependence in Italian cities is present only in those 
cities where mayors can run for reelection and are not backed by strong majorities. Solé-Ollé 
(2003) finds that property tax mimicking among Spanish municipalities is stronger in 
municipalities where the majority of the ruling parties is smaller and in election years. Finally, 
Allers and Elhorst (2005) study strategic interaction in residential property taxation in Dutch 
municipalities and find that interaction is weaker when the electoral margin is high.2 The 
2 All of these analysis study property tax interaction in a continuous dependent variable setting. 
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Dutch setting is very similar to the Norwegian and is characterized by low mobility of the tax 
base and politically highly visible decisions.   
Yardstick competition implies that the existence of property taxation in community i (dptaxi)
depends on the existence of property taxation in all other N communities that are suitable for 
voters to use as yardsticks. In our empirical specification we relate the tax choice in 
municipality i to the tax choice in contiguous municipalities that are allowed to levy property 
taxation and also a series of municipal characteristics (including the traditional determinants 
outlined above).  
The second extension of the fiscal demand model includes local political control problems 
that may motivate having property taxation as an incentive mechanism. The general Brennan-
Buchanan argument is developed in the context of property taxation by Glaeser (1996). It is 
based on the complementarity between local service provision and tax base via housing 
values. Gordon and Wilson (2000) and Wilson and Gordon (2003) analyze similar 
relationships between voters and officials emphasizing government waste (or slack) and in the 
context of tax competition. Property taxation may reduce waste since the officials will take 
into account the feedback via property values. Hoxby (1999) provides a theoretical framework 
to analyze costs and efforts in schools and introduces property taxation as a disciplining 
device. Property taxation links school quality to school financing and helps control costs and 
efforts in schools. More broadly Fischel (2001) introduces the concept of 'homevoters', 
homeowners whose voting is guided by their concern for home values. Since homeowners are 
locked into the locality, they focus on local government behavior and consequently the 
housing market disciplines local decisions. Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) supply empirical 
evidence that homeowners vote to protect their property values (voucher issue in California). 
The incentive effects of property taxation to hold down costs are shown by Borge and Rattsø 
(2006) comparing local governments with and without property tax in Norway. Fiva and 
Rønning (2006) find favorable incentive effects of property taxation on school district 
performance in Norway. 
In the empirical part we concentrate on political fragmentation. An extensive literature on 
fiscal policy outcomes based on Roubini and Sachs (1989) has shown the importance of 
political fragmentation for fiscal imbalance and the level of spending and taxation. Perotti and 
Kontopoulos (2002) offer a recent documentation. In the Norwegian local government setting, 
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Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) have shown how fragmentation is associated with higher 
administrative costs and Borge and Rattsø (2005) show that fragmentation increases the fee 
level. We hypothesize that local governments with more fragmented political system is more 
likely to have property taxation.  
Political fragmentation is measured by a Herfindahl-index of party fragmentation of the local 
council. When SHp is the share of representatives from party p, then the Herfindahl index for 
party fragmentation (HERF) is given by:  
P
2
p 1
HERF = SH p
 
¦ . (1) 
The Herfindahl-index is generally given by 1/P, when the representatives are equally divided 
among P parties. The index has maximum value of 1 when there is only one party in the 
council. The Herfindahl index ranges from 0.14 to 0.60 in our sample, with a sample mean of 
0.24.
The data are documented in Appendix Table 2. As control variables in all regressions we 
include population size, a measure of the income distribution (ratio of median to mean 
income, m
y
y ), the age distribution of the population (CHILDREN (below 5 years), YOUNG 
(between 6 and 15 years) and ELDERLY (above 66 years)), and share of the population living 
in rural areas. 
4. Spatial Econometric Issues 
Different approaches for undertaking estimation and inference in linear regression models 
with spatial effects are well developed. However, spatial models with discrete dependent 
variables have received little attention in the literature and empirical implementation of such 
models is an area of active research. Estimation of spatial discrete models yields contrary to 
linear spatial models a non-spherical variance-covariance matrix. An important consequence 
of the complex variance-covariance structure is that the error term will be heteroskedastic 
(Anselin, 2002). This renders standard probit or tobit estimation inconsistent. The underlying 
problem is the (potential) interdependence in the endogenous variable giving rise to 
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simultaneity. Case et al. (1993) innovated the econometric investigation of this type of 
strategic interaction in a study of the expenditure levels among US state governments (in the 
continuous setting). To solve the simultaneity problem in the discrete setting we need to rely 
on a spatial latent variable approach.3 Following Fleming (2004), the underlying latent model 
specification with spatial dependence can be expressed as: 
U  dptax* Wdptax* xȕ u , (2) 
The observed variable, dptaxi, is a dummy variable identifying local governments with 
residential property taxation and dptaxi* is its unobserved latent counterpart. The observed 
dptaxi equals unity when dptaxi*>0 and is zero otherwise. W is a symmetric 301x301 weight 
matrix, with zeros in the diagonal and with elements wij different from zero if the two local 
governments are considered to be neighbors. X is a matrix of property tax determinants of 
every local government, ȕ is a vector of parameters and u is a vector of error terms which we 
for now assume to be normally distributed with homoscedastic variance: 
2(0, )uN Vu  . (3) 
The spatial weights matrix, W, is determined apriori and can be considered as part of local 
government i's basic characteristics. In this analysis we follow the literature on fiscal 
competition and choose a definition of neighbors as municipalities with a common border. Wij
= 1/mi for all municipalities that are contiguous to municipal i, where mi is the number of 
observations that are contiguous to municipal i. Wdptax* is a weighted average of the 
propensity for neighboring local governments to levy property taxation. ȡ captures interaction 
in the latent variable which we expect to be statistically different from zero if yardstick 
competition is a relevant aspect of the property tax determination.
It should be noticed that the strategic interaction in (2) technically implies that it is the 
neighbor’s latent variable (Wdptax*) that matters for local government i, and not neighbors’ 
observed decisions (Wdptax). The straightforward formulation of the interaction is that the 
observed existence of property taxation depends on the observed property taxation of the 
3 Other studies which pursue different versions of the spatial latent variable approach include Case (1992), 
Pinkse and Slade (1998), Holloway et al. (2002) and Klier and Mcmillen (2005). 
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neighbors ( U  dptax Wdptax xȕ u ), while a formulation where the propensity to levy 
property taxation depends on the observed property taxation of the neighbors is an 
intermediate case ( U  dptax* Wdptax xȕ u ). We estimate the standard probit model with 
an exogenous spatial lag as an alternative to the latent variable model. Although this model is 
inconsistent due to simultaneity bias, it lies closer to the underlying theoretical concept of 
yardstick competition. As will come clear, the strength of the interaction estimated is 
seriously affected by the formulation applied. As Klier and McMillen (2005:8) point out, only 
the latent model represents algebraically consistent handling of the endogeneity problem.  
Our spatial autoregressive probit model (SARP) given by (2) yields correlation between 
Wdptax* and the disturbances, even when the latter are iid. The endogeneity problem can 
easily be seen from writing (2) on reduced form (assuming that ( - )UI W is invertible): 
-1 -1=( - ) ( - )U Udptax* I W xȕ I W u , (4) 
implying that 
-1 2(( ) ) ( - ) uE U V zWdptax* u' W I W 0 . (5) 
Non-spatial probit estimation yields in this case biased and inconsistent estimators. Note that 
contrary to the linear case, it is complicated to utilize standard Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
estimation of ȡ because the SARP specification given by (2) introduces a non-spherical 
variance-covariance matrix given by: 
> @ 1 2' uU U V Cov(u) (I - W)(I - W) . (6) 
The error terms will consequently be homoscedastic only if ȡ=0. Contrary to models with 
continuous dependent variables, the discrete dependent model with heteroskedastic error 
terms yields inconsistent estimates. There are basically two potential remedies to this 
problem. Some authors, such as Case (1992) and Pinkse and Slade (1998), have proposed to 
ignore the off-diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix and focus on the 
heteroscedasticity induced by spatial dependence. This method yields consistent, but not fully 
efficient estimates of the spatial probit model. To obtain consistent and fully efficient 
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estimators, one has to deal with multidimensional integrals (Anselin, 2002). Fleming (2004) 
presents a survey of different simulation techniques available for solving this problem. He 
concludes that the Bayesian approach based on Lesage (2000) is the most flexible method. 
We follow the Bayesian approach when empirically analyzing yardstick competition in 
section 5 and 6.4
The Bayesian approach is a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method based on the Gibbs 
Sampler. This is a data augmenting procedure which provides the linkage between the 
discrete dependent variable and its latent continuous counterpart. We refer the reader to 
Lesage (2000) and Fleming (2004) for a complete presentation of the method. A general 
introduction to the Gibbs sampler can be found in Casella and George (1992). The Gibbs 
sampler introduces a conditional distribution for the censored variable conditional on all other 
parameters in the model. This distribution is used to produce a random draw for each value of 
the dependent variable in the probit specification. Once a sample for the unobserved latent 
dependent variable is established, the problem reduces to the linear spatial auto-regressive 
model which can be estimated with traditional ML methods. The Bayesian approach allows 
for heteroskedastic error terms even after controlling for spatial dependence, ensuring that 
parameter inconsistency is not driven by heteroskedastic influences (Fleming 2004: 156). This 
allows (3) to be generalized as: 
2
1 2(0, ),  ( , ,..., )u nN diag v v vV  u V V . (7) 
Technically the Gibbs sampler proceeds as follows: 
1. Start with arbitrary initial values for the parameter vector: 
 2 1 2 1 2, , , ,..., , , ,...,u k nv v vV U E E E .
2. Estimate 2uV  given all other parameters and the data. 
3. Estimate 1 2( , ,..., )kE E E  given all other parameters and the data. 
4. Estimate  1 2, ,..., nv v v  given all other parameters and the data. 
5. Estimate U  given all other parameters and the data. 
                                                
4 The analysis is carried out using James Lesage’s spatial econometric toolbox in the Matlab environment and 
Tim Thomas’ corrected scripts (Lesage, 2003 and Thomas, 2005). 
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6. Sample the conditional distribution for the latent variable (dptax*) given all parameter 
values.  
This completes one pass of the Gibbs sampler process.5 The Gibbs sampler process is then 
repeated a large number of times to derive conditional distributions for all the parameters. The 
mean of the conditional distribution is the final parameter estimate and the standard deviation 
of the distribution is used for inference. All MCMC sampling procedures reported below are
based on 10000 draws with the first 2000 draws omitted. The first draws are omitted to allow 
the sampler to achieve a steady-state (the so called ‘burn-in period’). Note that estimates 
based on 1000 draws with the first 200 draws omitted were close to identical to the reported 
estimates, suggesting that one need not carry out an excessive number of draws in practice.6
Note that we need to fix one of the unknown parameters in order to identify the other 
unknowns in the model (Holloway et al. 2002:394). We adopt the usual practice and fix 2uV
equal to unity.  
An observed spatial pattern in property taxation is not necessarily due to competition among 
local governments. Also common shocks and unobserved correlates will appear as spatial 
auto-correlation. In empirical work it is a challenge to separate the spatial auto-regressive 
probit (SARP) model from the spatial error probit model. With spatially correlated omitted 
variables, we have a pattern of spatial error of the form: 
 u ȜMu İ , (8) 
where İ is a well behaved error term and M is a neighbor matrix. Estimating the SARP model 
introduced above can in principle lead to a false conclusion of yardstick competition (ȡ>0) 
when ȡ=0 holds in the true model. The ability to separate spatial lag from spatial error 
depends on the quality of the other explanatory variables in (2).7 Bordignon et al. (2003) 
argue that yardstick competition is likely to show up as spatial error because the spatial lag 
model implicitly assumes that tax rates are spatially correlated independently of the levels of 
the other covariates, while the spatial error model tests for correlation of the tax rates which 
                                                
5 Lesage (2000) has derived all the conditional distributions for the limited dependent Bayesian spatial models 
and it is this sampling procedure that is used to obtain parameter estimates.  
6 We have also experimented with 20 000, 30 000 and 50 000 draws. The estimate of ȡ does not change. 
7 Anselin et al. (1996) have proposed some LM tests to separate spatial error from spatial lag, but these are not 
implementable in the discrete endogenous variable case.  
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cannot be explained by the other covariates. In section 5 we estimate both the spatial lag and 
the spatial error model and compare which model which best fit the data. 
In section 6 we present an extension of the spatial probit analysis and have a look at the 
determination of the property tax revenue. The endogenous variable here is the annual 
property tax payment for a standardized house (ptax). The latent spatial tobit specification is 
given by:  
U  ptax* Wptax* xȕ İ . (9) 
The observed dependent variable, ptaxi, is equal to ptaxi* if ptaxi*>0 and 0 otherwise. In 
section 6 we present results for both the non-spatial and the Bayesian spatial tobit model (both 
lag and error specification).  
5. The Discrete Choice of Having Property Taxes 
The benchmark analysis looks at characteristics of the local governments important to explain 
the existence of the property tax, ignoring the spatial dimension. Specification A in Table 1 
presents the results for the standard non-spatial probit model. The fiscal demand variables 
included are private income level and central government grants. The likelihood of having 
property tax decreases with the level of private income. The effect is statistically significant 
and quantitatively important. Evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables, one standard 
deviation increase in private income reduces the probability of levying property tax with 
approximately 20 percentage points. Since private income represents both a demand effect 
and is an indicator of the local tax base, the negative coefficient shows that the tax base effect 
dominates. In the demand framework, higher private income is expected to lead to higher 
demand for local public services and having property tax is a way of arranging additional 
revenue. Central government grants have no statistically significant effect. This result is 
consistent with the flypaper effect. 
Political fragmentation (measured by the Herfindahl index, HERF) is shown to influence the 
choice of property taxation. Higher value of the index means less party fragmentation of the 
local council. The negative coefficient implies that increased party fragmentation is associated 
with higher likelihood of having property taxation. The quantitative effect is of political 
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importance. Evaluated at the mean, one standard deviation increase in party fragmentation 
increases the likelihood of having property tax by about 5.7 percentage points. In our setting 
the result is consistent with the understanding that political fragmentation motivates property 
taxation. The party fragmentation of the local council motivates the introduction of property 
taxation to improve the incentives of the officials of the local government. 
Table 1 about here 
The positive relationship between political fragmentation and likelihood of having property 
taxation may be interpreted in a different context. The studies of political fragmentation and 
fiscal policy innovated by Roubini and Sachs (1989) emphasize political fragmentation as a 
source of fiscal inefficiency. Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) argue that political 
fragmentation may lead to excessive government and consequently a high tax level. In the 
Norwegian context, Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) show that political fragmentation in local 
governments has economic effects, in their data they found excessive administrative spending 
in fragmented councils. Borge (1995) find that political fragmentation is associated with 
higher level of user charges. In this understanding our relationship between fragmentation and 
property taxation may reflect 'political strength'. A strong political leadership may be better 
able to hold down the tax (and spending) level. The separation between these two 
explanations is addressed in section 6. 
The choice of property taxation also seems to be an ideological issue. The share of socialists 
in the local council is an important predictor of property taxation. More socialists increase the 
likelihood of having property taxation. The size of the effect is quite large. Increasing the 
share of socialists by 10 percentage points, increases the likelihood of having property 
taxation by 14 percentage points. The average socialist share is 37%, and one standard 
deviation increase raises the likelihood by about 18 percentage points. The result is consistent 
with the results of Borge and Rattsø (2004), who study the socialist influence in a model 
focused on the role of income distribution for the tax structure. Petterson (2004) has shown a 
similar effect of socialist orientation on the tax level in a Swedish study using the 
discontinuity method to compare local governments close to 50% socialists. 
The model is extended to include the existence of property taxation in neighboring 
communities. The geographical distribution of the use of residential property taxation as a 
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local tax shows a clear pattern. The distribution follows to some extent the rural-urban 
dimension. But we also find significant differences across counties that hardly can be 
explained along this dimension. As an example we note that none of the municipalities in the 
counties Vestfold and Akershus levy residential property taxation (see Appendix Table 3).  
The counties are close to Oslo and most of the local governments have a high private income 
level.  
To take into account strategic interaction among neighboring governments we extend model 
A to include a spatially lagged dependent variable. The extended formulations are shown in 
models B and C in Table 1. Model B is a straightforward Probit estimation, ignoring 
simultaneity, while model C is based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique 
outlined in section 4. We find that yardstick competition certainly is important to explain the 
existence of property taxation. The statistical effect is solid in both model B and C. The 
marginal effect of yardstick competition is overstated when we ignore the inherent 
simultaneity problem, comparing models B and C. While the naïve Probit estimation finds an 
estimated reaction function coefficient ( Uˆ ) of 1.72, the MCMC technique estimate is 0.22. 
The marginal effects are 0.56 and 0.07, respectively, evaluated at the sample averages for the 
explanatory variables. 
While yardstick competition is clearly confirmed in both specifications, the difference in 
economic impact between the two is substantial. The simultaneous latent formulation 
indicates that the likelihood that a local government will levy property taxation increases with 
2 percentage points if one additional neighbor starts levying property taxation (assuming 4 
neighbors). This is hardly of economic importance. The corresponding effect for the naïve 
probit is 13.5 percentage points, which must be considered to be economically relevant. The 
difference is expected on theoretical grounds. In the naïve model B it is assumed that local 
governments take into account the observed property taxation of the neighbors, with a stark 
difference between those with and those without property taxation. In the latent model C 
formulation, the local governments take into account the predicted likelihood of having 
property taxation of the neighbors. This likelihood will show much less variation between 
local governments, and consequently the interaction effect will be much smaller. Yardstick 
competition theory suggests that municipalities have incentives to mimick neighboring 
municipalities, and a model that takes into account revealed decisions of neighbors rather than 
neighboring municipalities’ propensities to have property taxation is best suited to capture 
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strategic interaction. The revealed decision model does not offer an algebraically consistent 
handling of the endogeneity problem. Hence we apply the naïve model B as an illustration of 
the potential bias due to the spatial latent model formulation. A more conservative approach is 
to consider ˆMCMCU  to be a lower bound and the ˆMLU to be an upper bound of the true U . As an 
alternative to the spatial lag model, we also estimate the spatial error probit model with the 
MCMC approach, reported as specification D in Table 1. Again we find evidence of a 
geographic pattern in the property taxation decisions. The spatial error probit yields a Pseudo-
R2 and a spatial effect (Ȝ) of the same magnitudes as in model C. We cannot rule out that 
omitted spatially correlated variables are an important part of the spatial auto-correlation, but 
our set of control variables do include the factors shown to be of importance in other studies 
of local taxation in Norway.8
Ignoring spatial dependence generally leads non-spatial models to attribute spatial 
autocorrelation in the dependent variable to explanatory variables rather than assign this 
variation to spatial dependence. This can potentially yield seriously biased effects in non-
spatial models. We find that this is not the case for the discrete choice of property taxation. 
Comparing model A to model C we find that all marginal effects are only slightly 
underestimated in the non-spatial probit model. 
6. The Determinants of Property Tax Revenue 
It is of interest to investigate whether yardstick competition and political fragmentation also 
influences the level of property taxation in the local governments. As a starting point we have 
had a look at the demand determinants of the standardized property tax revenue in a simple 
OLS among the 103 local governments with property taxation (not reported). Central 
government grants come out as the main determinant of the property tax revenue. Higher 
grants induce local governments to reduce the property tax level given that they have property 
taxation. This revenue substitution is the standard result in this kind of studies (see Borge and 
Rattsø, 2004). The private income level has a negative effect on the property tax level. We 
interpret this as the effect of higher property tax base associated with higher personal income. 
                                                
8 The estimated spatial lag parameter is generally not sensitive to what control variables that are included in our 
probit specifications (or tobit specifications, reported below). Since the interaction effect does not change much 
as additional covariates are included in the regression it is less likely to change if we were able to add some of 
the potentially missing omitted variables. The spatial error parameter is somewhat more sensitive to what control 
variables that are included. 
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No political variables have any statistically significant effect on the property tax level given 
that they have property taxation. It seems that only economic variables influence the size of 
the property tax revenue given property taxation. 
In the combined tobit analysis of the propensity to have property taxation and the level of 
property tax revenue both economic and political determinants are important. The benchmark 
tobit analysis without spatial interaction is reported as model E in Table 2. Political 
fragmentation is shown to be an important determinant of the property tax revenue. Since 
political fragmentation has no effect on property tax revenue, given property taxation, but has 
a statistically significant effect in the tobit formulation, we conclude that political 
fragmentation first and for all is important for the choice of having property taxation or not. 
This is consistent with the interpretation that political fragmentation motivates having 
property taxation as an incentive mechanism. We also find statistically significant effects of 
political ideology and private income level.  
Moving on to the spatial tobit specifications we find that property tax revenue certainly is 
affected by yardstick competition. The average property tax revenue is about NOK 1000 
(USD 150) per standardized house. The estimated neighborhood effects in models F, G and H 
in Table 2, are statistically and economically significant. Again, we find as expected that 
ignoring simultaneity yields an upward bias in the estimated strategic interaction. Based on 
the MCMC technique we find an interaction coefficient based on the spatial lag specification 
of 0.22. The spatial error specification suggests an interaction coefficient of 0.32. The 
estimates implies that when neighboring local governments increase their property taxation 
with NOK 1000 per house, then the local government under study increases the property 
taxation with NOK 220 or NOK 320 according to model formulation. This is similar to what 
existing European studies of property tax interaction report. Allers and Elhorst (2005), 
Bordignon et al. (2003) and Solé-Ollé (2003) find reaction coefficients of around 0.3-0.4 
studying property tax decisions in a continuous setting in the Netherlands, Italy and Spain, 
respectively. We interpret the highly statistical significant evidence of spatial auto-correlation 
provided in table 2 as evidence that local governments look to their geographic neighbors 
when making property tax decisions. As in the probit case, we find that the estimated effects 
of the other covariates are not sensitive to controlling for spatial auto-correlation.  
Table 2 about here 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
The starting point of the paper is the recent interest in decentralization with property taxation 
as an incentive mechanism to stimulate efficient resource use in the public sector. Local 
governments in Norway can choose to have residential property tax, and their choice can 
inform us about their evaluation of the incentives involved. The standard demand model 
assumes that property taxes are determined based on the economic tradeoff between the 
benefit of more services and the cost of higher taxes. Two additional aspects of the discrete 
choice of having property taxation are investigated, the roles of political fragmentation and 
yardstick competition. We test the hypothesis that fragmentation and competition influence 
the decision to have property taxation. Econometric challenges of spatial models with discrete 
dependent variables are addressed.  
The empirical results indicate that fragmentation motivates property taxation to control the 
associated common pool problems and that yardstick competition generates a distinct 
geographic pattern in local taxation. In an extension of the analysis we show that these 
mechanisms are also important for the property tax level. The quantitative effect of the fiscal 
interaction depends on model formulation. It is a challenge for future research to discriminate 
between alternative econometric representations of fiscal competition with discrete dependent 
variables. 
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This paper adds to the literature by utilizing improved data on tax revenue decentral-
ization to reexamine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and the size of
government. An econometric analysis using panel data from 18 OECD countries shows
that fiscal decentralization matters for both the size and the composition of govern-
ment spending. Tax revenue decentralization is associated with a smaller public sector,
while expenditure decentralization is associated with a larger public sector. The results
indicate that the former effect is driven by a reduction in social security transfers, while
the latter effect is driven by increased government consumption.
Keywords: fiscal federalism, subcentral fiscal autonomy, size of government, composi-
tion of government
JEL classification: H 11, H 53, H 77
1. Introduction
Early contributions to the theory of ﬁscal competition emphasize the pos-
sibility that interjurisdictional competition within a country leads to inefﬁ-
ciently low levels of taxes and expenditures (as formalized by Wilson, 1986,
and Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). Based on similar reasoning, there is
a large literature going back to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave (1959) that
warns against the consequences of decentralized responsibility for redistri-
bution. Another strand of literature stresses that governments do not always
act in the best interest of the citizens, and that ﬁscal competition may help
to constrain a public sector that would otherwise be inefﬁciently large (the
* This work was initiated while I was visiting the Institute for Quantitative Social Science
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garescu for making his data on ﬁscal decentralization available.
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argument of Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). Since households are more
mobile among jurisdictions within a country than among countries, all these
theories suggest that the size of the public sector is expected to vary inversely
with the extent of ﬁscal decentralization.
Leaving aside the welfare consequences, a large empirical literature, ini-
tiated by Oates (1985), has looked for downward pressure on taxes and
spending from decentralization of ﬁscal powers. Although a myriad of stud-
ies have emerged since Oates’s seminal contribution, an empirical consensus
have not been reached. The econometric analyses can be divided into two
groups: those who focus on variation in decentralization across subcentral
units within countries, and those who focus on variation across countries.1
A major problem with almost all of the latter is that they rely on a prob-
lematic measure of ﬁscal decentralization. These studies typically rely on the
Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and describe the degree of ﬁscal decentralization as the subcentral
share of total government spending or revenue . Although the GFS provides
consistent deﬁnitions across countries and over time, the data set fails to
address properly the intergovernmental ﬁscal structure of countries, and in
particular ignores the degree of central government control over local tax
rates and tax bases. Strict use of account data may consequently give rise to
confounded results because the correspondence between budgetary items
and actual decision-making may be imperfect. Although this is widely ac-
cepted, almost all cross-country analyses rely purely on GFS data to study
the relationship between ﬁscal decentralization and the size of the public
sector, including Anderson and van den Berg (1998), Ehdaie (1994), Jin and
Zou (2002), and Oates (1985).2
The current analysis is novel in several ways. First, improved data on ﬁscal
decentralization is introduced, and the standard regression evaluating the
relationship between government size and decentralization is reexamined.
Contrary to previous studies, the new data set, based on Stegarescu (2005),
differentiates between revenue of subcentral government levels according
to their ability to determine revenue sources autonomously. Second, I focus
on how ﬁscal decentralization affects different parts of the public sector, in
particular how it affects spending on social security transfers and government
consumption. The former can be argued to be more redistributive in nature
1 Feld et al. (2003) present an extensive literature review.
2 A notable exception is Rodden (2003). The measurement problems connected with the
IMF data are further discussed by Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), Rodden (2003, 2004), and
Stegarescu (2005) and are also identiﬁed by Oates (1989) as an important challenge for
future research: “in view of the forementioned reservations concerning the IMF data,
I would have much more conﬁdence in my ﬁnding of an absence of any relationship be-
tween ﬁscal centralization and public sector size at the national level were it conﬁrmed by
another study using a new data set” (1989, p. 582).
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andmight consequently be differently affectedby ﬁscal decentralization than
the latter.On theoretical grounds, countries with decentralized responsibility
for redistribution ﬁnd it harder to redistribute between households, because
generous redistributiveprograms serve toattract low-incomehouseholds and
chase away thosewith higher incomes,whose taxesmust ﬁnance the transfers.
Third, a substantial part of the ﬁscal federalism literature typically assumes,
implicitly or explicitly, that lower levels of government both collect taxes
and spend funds, so regional authorities can be classiﬁed as low-tax–low-
services or high-tax–high-services (Bardhan, 2002). This assumed connection
between local revenues and spending can be quite problematic, since many
countries have a tendency towards vertical ﬁscal imbalance. Evaluating the
size and composition of government, the current study stresses that it is
important to distinguish between decentralization of taxing powers and of
spending powers.
The empirical analysis is based on panel data from 18 OECD countries3
over the period 1970 to 2000, where period averages are utilized to prevent
business-cycle ﬂuctuations from creating a spurious relationship between
decentralization and government spending. Consistent with recent studies
that take the distinction between different types of decentralization seri-
ously, notably Jin and Zou (2002), Rodden (2003), and Stein (1999), I ﬁnd an
asymmetric effect of tax revenue decentralization and expenditure decen-
tralization on government spending. Oates’s conclusion that it “makes little
difference whether we use a revenue or expenditure measure of the extent of
ﬁscal centralization” (1985, p. 754) does not hold for the new and improved
indicator of tax revenue decentralization. The econometric analysis suggests
that tax revenue decentralization depresses the total size of government (as
suggested by ﬁscal competition theory), while expenditure decentralization
is associated with a larger public sector. This is interpreted to be a result
of vertical ﬁscal imbalance, which attenuates the link between ﬁnancing of
the public sector and its performance. Such vertical ﬁscal imbalance creates
a common-pool problem while simultaneously allowing public ofﬁcials to
ignore the ﬁnancial consequences of competition for mobile tax bases and
poor provision of public services.
Evaluating the twomainparts of overall government expenditures – trans-
fers and government consumption – I ﬁnd that the asymmetric effect on tax
revenueandexpendituredecentralization seems tobedrivenby twodifferent
parts of government expenditures. Social security transfers decrease in rev-
enue decentralization, but are independent of expenditure decentralization.
3 The 18 countries included in the analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Government consumption is independent of tax revenue decentralization,
but increases in expenditure decentralization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theor-
etical framework and the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data on
ﬁscal decentralization, and section 4 introduces data ongovernment spending
and presents the econometric design. In section 5 the results are presented;
section 6 carries out some sensitivity analysis. Section 7 discusses the re-
sults in relation to the theoretical literature on ﬁscal competition. Section 8
concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government
Two different approaches, rooted in two contrasting views of public-sector
decision-making, have typically been applied to analyze the effect of ﬁscal
competition between horizontally related governments. One strand of liter-
ature has maintained that, assuming benevolent policymakers who seek to
maximize the “well-being of society,” ﬁscal competition can create a welfare-
reducing race to thebottom inpublic-goodprovision.BrennanandBuchanan
(1980) challenge the notion that tax competition is welfare-reducing. Starting
with the assumption that governments are revenue-maximizing Leviathans,
they argue that emigration imposes a serious restriction on the ability of
government to exploit taxes. It follows that decentralization of the public
sector introduces elements of competition that contribute to contain agency
problems. This is the argument underpinning the famous Leviathan hypoth-
esis: “total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris
paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decen-
tralized” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 185).
Brennan and Buchanan emphasize that the Leviathan hypothesis should
be evaluated for a given extent of collusion among governmental units. One
obvious form of collusion would be agreements between subcentral and
central government about revenue-sharing programs, where the subcentral
government cedes taxing powers to the central government and receive
grants in return (Grossman, 1989; Ehdaie, 1994). Brennan and Buchanan
(1980, p. 183) conclude that such an arrangement is undesirable “because
it subverts the primary purpose of federalism, which is to create competi-
tion between jurisdictions.”Clearly,decentralizationof expenditureswithout
accompanying decentralization of revenues is unlikely to generate any bene-
ﬁcial competition to restrain the Leviathan. The broader problem related to
such vertical ﬁscal imbalance is the attenuated link between ﬁnancing and
performance of the public sector, together with the possibility for subcentral
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governments to impose their costs on residents outside their jurisdiction.
Thus, based on the Leviathan hypothesis, it is reasonable to expect decen-
tralization of spending powers (ceteris paribus) to be positively and decen-
tralization of taxing powers (ceteris paribus) to be negatively associated with
the size of government.
Note that other links between ﬁscal decentralization and government
size may also exist: (1) because decentralization provides a better match
between the population’s preferences and public tax-expenditure bundles
(as captured in the decentralization theorem of Oates, 1972)4 or (2) be-
cause political agents at the subcentral level are better able to tailor public
goods to their constituency’s needs (Oates, 1972), or (3) because decentral-
ization increases the accountability and visibility of public ofﬁcials, which
may lead to more competent and less corrupt government.5 On theoretical
grounds it is not clear how these three mechanisms affect the size of the
public sector. Less waste in the public sector is not necessarily associated
with a smaller public sector. A more efﬁcient public sector implies lower
marginal costs of public services, which leads residents to increase their de-
mand for these expenditures. As a result, the total size of government may
increase.
2.2. Fiscal Decentralization and the Composition of Government
An important issue in evaluating the effect of ﬁscal decentralization on the
size of government, which seems to have been neglected in the previous lit-
erature, is that decentralization may have different effects on different parts
of the public sector.6 Keen and Marchand (1996) show that ﬁscal competi-
tion may lead not only to inefﬁcient levels of aggregate public expenditures,
but also to systematic inefﬁciencies in the composition of public expendi-
tures. They present a theoretical framework with a benevolent planner and
focus on two parts of public spending: The ﬁrst is a local public good, such
as consumption of social services or redistributive payments from altruistic
rich households to poor households. The second is a local public input in
the economy’s production function and corresponds, for example, to infra-
structure spending.Assuming immobile workers and mobile ﬁrms, Keen and
Marchand show that, holding the size of the public sector constant, welfare
4 In its purest form, a centralized system provide a “one size ﬁts all” public-sector outcome
that does not reﬂect local needs, while in a decentralized system, local governments offer
different public tax–expenditure bundles, which mobile households can choose between
by “voting with their feet.”
5 Utilizing cross-country data, Fisman and Gatti (2002) ﬁnd that decentralization is associ-
ated with lower levels of corruption.
6 Faguet (2004) is to some extent an exception. He evaluates how decentralization changed
local investment patterns in Bolivia.
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could be increased by a rebalancing of expenditures from publicly provided
inputs towards provision of local public goods that beneﬁt immobile resi-
dents: “the picture that emerges is thus one in which ﬁscal competition leads
to too many business centers and airports but not enough parks or libraries”
(Keen and Marchand, 1996, p. 35).
Assuming immobile households, Keen and Marchand provide one ac-
count of why ﬁscal competition may put downward pressure on welfare
spending. In addition there is a large literature in public ﬁnance, going back
to Stigler (1957) and Musgrave (1959), that warns against the consequences
of decentralized responsibility for redistribution exactly because households
are mobile. The idea is that policies that are redistributive in nature give
rise to a phenomenon that resembles adverse selection: Net beneﬁciaries
of redistributive policies are attracted to generous jurisdictions, while net
contributors are repelled (Wildasin, 1991). This kind of reasoning led Stigler
(1957, p. 217) to the conclusion that “redistribution is intrinsically a national
policy.” The key point is that decentralized responsibility for redistribution
without any corrections induces each jurisdiction to choose its policy in isola-
tion, ignoring the positive external beneﬁts it creates for other jurisdictions.
Generally this yields redistribution levels lower than socially desirable, pos-
sibly leading to a race to the bottom.
3.Measuring Fiscal Decentralization --- New Data on
Decentralization of Taxing Powers
Fiscal decentralization reﬂects how responsibilities for tax revenues and pub-
lic expenditures are distributed among different tiers of government. The
complexity of vertical government structures make this notion challenging
to quantify. A reliable measure of ﬁscal decentralization needs to effec-
tively quantify the activities of subcentral governments arising from their
autonomous decisions. The standard approach in cross-country analyses is
to make use of accounting measures of revenue and expenditure shares for
subcentral relative to general government as a proxy for ﬁscal decentral-
ization. Until recently the data from the IMF’s GFS was the only available
cross-national time-series data to generate these measures. Although these
measures have the advantage of being operational, they can give rise to
seriously biased results (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2003).
The tax revenue decentralization measure provided by the GFS indicator
does not distinguishbetween locally determined taxes, taxes regulated by the
central government, taxes levied as surcharges on national taxes, and shared
taxes. Whether subcentral governments’ expenditure is funded by intergov-
ernmental grants, some revenue-sharing program, or own-source revenue
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through independent taxes and user charges clearly makes a difference. The
GFSmeasureof tax revenuedecentralizationwill consequently overestimate
the true extent of subcentral taxing autonomy. The GFS measure of decen-
tralization of spending powers is also likely to overestimate the true nature
of spending autonomy, since central governments may inﬂuence subcentral
decisions through directives, etc. Local expenditures that are mandated by
the central government or are spent on behalf of the central government ap-
pear as subcentral expenditures, even though subcentral governments may
have no autonomy in these spending decisions.
OECD (1999) tries to overcome the ﬁrst of these measurement problems
and present cross-country data that explicitly focus on the role of taxation
in determining the ﬁscal autonomy of subcentral governments. The study
aimed to classify taxes in terms of the kind of autonomy they provided
to state and local governments, hence focusing on tax revenue decentral-
ization. Stegarescu (2005) draws on the analytical framework provided by
OECD (1999) and expands its data set to cover 23 OECD countries from
1965 to 2001.7 Stegarescu’s data distinguishes between different kinds of
subcentral government revenue according to the degree of discretion sub-
central governments have in determining them autonomously. In this re-
spect the data represents a major improvement on existing measures of
ﬁscal decentralization.8 The second measurement problem, which concerns
subcentral government’s actual autonomy of expenditure decisions, remains
unsolved.
As discussed in section 2, decentralization of spending and taxing powers
may have an asymmetric effect on government expenditures. I have conse-
quently chosen to rely on both the improved measure of tax revenue decen-
tralization and the potentially problematic measure of expenditure decen-
tralization from the GFS in the following analysis. This leaves an asymmetry
between the accuracy of the two measures available, which may be problem-
atic. I have nonetheless chosen this strategy to stay as close as possible to
theory. Incorporating an improved measure of decentralization of spending
powers is an avenue for future research.
The key explanatory variables in the empirical analysis conducted below
are TaxRevDec and ExpDec. TaxRevDec measures the revenue share of
subcentral government relative to general government, but, contrary to what
is common in the literature, this variable only includes revenues where the
7 Contrary to the OECD study, Stegarescu (2005) considers not only subcentral govern-
ments’ autonomy of taxes, but also their size relative to general government.
8 Stegarescu (2005) ﬁnds that the GFS measure of tax revenue decentralization overesti-
mates the extent of ﬁscal decentralization. This is particularly the case for Austria (28.4%
versus 3.5%), Belgium (44.4% versus 24.6%), Germany (49.4% versus 7.3%), and Portu-
gal (8.7% versus 3.2%). The percentages refer to data from 1999 and 2000.
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subcentral government has discretionover tax rate, tax base, or both.ExpDec
is measured as the share of subcentral to general government expenditure,
and is based on the GFS. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for
TaxRevDec and ExpDec. Countries are on average more decentralized in
the expenditure than in the revenue dimension (34% versus 21%). But the
difference may be exaggerated, since expenditure decentralization is likely
to be overstated. The correlation between the two variables is 0.7.
Focusing on the more reliable measure of ﬁscal decentralization,
TaxRevDec, the 18 countries can be divided into three groups with respect
to decentralization trends in the period under study (1970–2000).9 A clear
trend towards an increasing role for subcentral governments can be observed
particularly for Belgium, France, and Spain, but also for Denmark, Japan,
Portugal, and Sweden;10 while three countries – Ireland, Norway, and the
U.K. – have moved in the opposite direction, toward less subcentral tax
autonomy. The remaining eight countries, including the traditional federal
countries – Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S.,
have had a fairly stable degree of tax revenue decentralization from 1970 to
2000. The trends seem to reﬂect very well the institutional changes that have
taken place in these countries (Stegarescu, 2005).
Figures 1 and 2 show the trends in the tax revenue decentralization indica-
tor based on 5-year averages, separated into traditional federal and unitary
countries. Figure 2 shows that the traditional federal countries underwent no
signiﬁcant changes during the last 30 years with respect to decentralization
of taxing powers. In the empirical analysis, estimations both with and without
these countries are reported.
4. Econometric Specification
The best empirical strategy to study the effect of ﬁscal decentralization on
public-sector spending would be to ﬁnd some sort of “natural experiment”
in which some countries have radically altered their vertical government
structure, and evaluate in particular how these reforms have changed gov-
ernment spending. During the time period that I study, some such reforms
have been implemented in some of the countries. To identify the effects of
9 Five countries are excluded from Stegarescu’s data set, because of size (Luxembourg and
Iceland), uncertainty with respect to data availability (Greece and Italy), or missing data
on the dependent variables (New Zealand).
10 Note that considerable differences in trends between the two measures of ﬁscal decen-
tralization are observed. Belgium and France, for example, have increased their subcen-
tral share of tax revenue considerably in the period under study (from 7% to 24% and
from 2% to 20%, respectively) while their expenditure decentralization remains basically
unaltered.
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Figure 1
Trends in Tax Revenue Decentralization for Traditional Unitary Countries
Note: 5-year averages, 1970–2000. First period: 1970–1976.
Figure 2
Trends in Tax Revenue Decentralization for Traditional Federal Countries
Note: 5-year averages, 1970–2000. First period: 1970–1976.
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these reforms I rely on the tax revenue indicator, TaxRevDec, introduced
in section 3, to work as a proxy. This indicator changed considerably in (for
example) Belgium in 1989, France in 1980, Portugal in 1989, and Spain in
1997, indicating that it captures reforms taking place in these countries well.
Utilizing panel data, inference can be based on variation across countries
and/or variation within countries. There are two arguments for relying pri-
marily on the latter: ﬁrst, because inherent features of different countries
that affect government spending, but are not captured in any of the included
regressors, yield biased cross-country estimations; second, because ﬁscal de-
centralizationprobably ismeasuredmore consistently over timewithin coun-
tries than across countries. The problem with the within-country approach is
that vertical government structure varies considerably more across countries
thanwithin countries (as illustrated in ﬁgures 1 and 2). Thus, basing inference
purely on within-country variation removes a lot of variation in the data. In
the empirical analysis presented below, I present estimates based on both
cross-country and within-country variation.
The standard approach – “searching for Leviathan” in the spirit of Oates
(1985) – is to regress some measure of government size on expenditure or
tax revenue decentralization and a set of control variables. I reexamine the
relationship between government size and ﬁscal decentralization, utilizing
new data on subcentral ﬁscal autonomy. The econometric speciﬁcation is
given by
GovernmentSizeit = α1 + 1TaxRevDecit + δ1ExpDecit
(1)+ γ1controlsit + uit ,
where GovernmentSizeit is government spending as a share of GDP in coun-
try i at time t, 1 and δ1 measure the effect of ﬁscal decentralization on
public-sector size and are the coefﬁcients of interest, and uit is an i.i.d. error
term. Since ExpDec may overestimate the true extent of expenditure de-
centralization for some countries, I report results both with and without this
variable. To take into account all other potentially important determinants of
government expenditures that might be correlated with ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion, amatrix of controls is included. These are elaboratedbelow.Descriptive
statistics are included in appendix tables 7 and 8.
As emphasized in section 2, the effects of ﬁscal decentralization may dif-
fer according to the extent that the public spending enters as an input into
the production function. It may also be reasonable to expect the effects
to differ according to the redistributive effect of different kinds of govern-
ment spending. Hence, separating public spending according to the United
Nations Classiﬁcation of the Functions of Government (COFOG) could be
useful. Unfortunately, there is, as far as I know, no reliable longer time
series available in the cross-country setting for this classiﬁcation. Thus, as
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a ﬁrst investigation, the current analysis focuses on the two main parts of
government expenditures: social security transfers (Transfers) and govern-
ment consumption (GovernmentConsumption). Like the general measure of
the size of government, these variables are based on OECD data. Transfers
is deﬁned as “beneﬁts for sickness, old-age, family allowances, etc., social
assistance grants and welfare beneﬁts paid by general government” and is
commonly used in the welfare-state literature (see, for example, Garrett and
Mitchell, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Rodrik, 1997, 1998; and Swank,
2002). GovernmentConsumption is deﬁned by the OECD as “expenditure,
including imputed expenditure, incurred by general government on both
individual consumption goods and services and collective consumption ser-
vices.” Due to the difﬁculty of valuing government services, this measure
is related to the cost of government services, including most signiﬁcantly
the wage bill. Some of the dominant categories in government consumption
are spending on public administration, public order, education, health, and
national defense (Rodrik, 1998).
Comparing the period 1970–1976 with the period 1996–2000, we ﬁnd
that most countries have expanded their spending on consumption, trans-
fers, and overall spending relative to GDP. The data reveals large cross-
country differences, but also considerable within-country differences. The
average spending on transfers out of GDP increased from 10.7% in 1970–
1976 to 14.5% in 1996–2000, peaking in the mid 1990s. GovernmentSize
and GovernmentConsumption exhibit similar trends. Although Transfers is
not a perfect measure of welfare spending, it is reasonable to argue that
it captures important aspects of the welfare state, in particular the effort
to carry out redistribution. To identify the effects of ﬁscal decentralization
on Transfers and GovernmentConsumption, I estimate the following two
speciﬁcations:
Transfersit = α2 + 2TaxRevDecit + δ2ExpDecit + γ2controlsit + εit ,
(2)
GovernmentConsumptionit = α3 + 3TaxRevDecit + δ3ExpDecit
(3)+ γ3controlsit + ηit ,
where εit and ηit are i.i.d. error terms. Pooling all the data and running an
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression on (1), (2), and (3) provide consis-
tent and unbiased results only if the error terms can be considered to be
random across countries and over time. This is a strong assumption to make.
A potential remedy is to estimate a restricted version of (1), (2), and (3)
that includes a full battery of time and country ﬁxed effects (FE). Such FE
estimation removes a lot of variation in the data and consequently reduces
the signal-to-noise ratio, which in effect is likely to bias the estimates towards
zero. On the other hand, ﬁscal decentralization is probably measured more
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consistently over time within countries than across countries. This is a strong
argument for relying primarily on FE estimation. In the empirical analysis,
presented in section 5, both approaches are followed.11
Although the data set provided by Stegarescu (2005) represents an im-
provement relative to existing data, it is not ﬂawless. In particular, one might
worry that tax revenue decentralization will be sensitive to business-cycle
ﬂuctuations due to differing elasticities of the tax base of subcentral and
central government, even when the assignment of competencies remains
unchanged. To prevent such business-cycle ﬂuctuations from creating a spu-
rious relation between decentralization and government expenditures, I base
the regressions on period averages for all variables.12 A period is deﬁned as
ﬁve consecutive nonoverlapping years between 1970 and 2000.13 Introduc-
ing period averages reduces the measurement problem induced by business
cycles. In addition I include several macro variables as controls: the unem-
ployment rate (which will also capture direct entitlement pressures), GDP
per capita, and economic growth.
In addition to the macro variables, it is obviously important to control
for other variables that may be correlated with both decentralization and
government spending. Previous studies focus on a number of explanatory
variables. Rodrik (1998) ﬁnds that one of the most important determinants
of government spending is the economy’s exposure to trade. In addition,
demographic and structural characteristics are often found to have an effect
on public-sector spending. Consequently I control for Openness, country size
(Population), and the shares of people who are living in rural areas, who are
under 15 years old, andwho are over 65 years old. In addition to these proxies
for political demand, I also control explicitly for partisanship by including
the share of the cabinet from left and center parties.
Previous research has found a negative relationship between a simple
dummy for federal political systems, as deﬁned according to (for example)
Riker (1964),14 and government spending. Cameron (1978), for example,
whose main contribution was to discuss the role of an open economy in
promoting public spending, found that federalism “dampens the degree of
expansion in the public economy.” Federalism is often suggested as a way of
reducing the role of the state in general, by fragmenting central authority and
11 As a robustness test I also check whether my FE estimations are robust to the exclusion
of the federal countries, which have had a stable vertical government structure from 1970
to 2000.
12 Note that the panel-data studies by Jin and Zou (2002) and Rodden (2003) based their in-
ference on year-to-year changes.
13 The ﬁrst period consist of six years, 1970–1975.
14 A federal country has, according to Riker (1964), at least two levels of government, of
which each must have “at least one area in which it is autonomous.” This must be for-
mally guaranteed in, for instance, a constitution (Riker, 1964; Treisman, 2002).
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introducing more interjurisdictional competition and checks and balances
(Bardhan, 2002).15 Consequently it is of interest to investigate whether the
effect of decentralization is robust to the inclusion of a simple dummy for
federalism.16 Note that because there is time variation in federalism only for
one country (Belgium), inference must be based on cross-country variation,
which is vulnerable to omitted-variable bias.
5. Results
Table 2 displays the benchmark results. The results are based on period
averages for 18 countries, 1970–2000, where a full set of period dummies
are included to soak up common period-speciﬁc shocks. Two different ver-
sions of the speciﬁcations (1), (2), and (3) in section 4 are estimated: one
where tax revenue decentralization enters alone, and one where tax revenue
decentralization and expenditure decentralization enter simultaneously, in
addition to all other controls. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) in table 2 are rein-
vestigations of the classic Oates (1985) model, relying on pooled panel data
from OECD countries and the improved tax revenue indicator. Control-
ling for expenditure decentralization, tax revenue decentralization is neg-
atively associated with size of government. Expenditure decentralization,
on the other hand is, ceteris paribus, associated with a larger public sec-
tor. Contrary to what Oates (1985) ﬁnds, it does seem to matter whether
expenditure or tax revenue decentralization is used as a proxy for ﬁscal
decentralization.
According to speciﬁcation (2) in table 2, it is not decentralization per se,
but only ﬁscal federalism accompanied by decentralization of tax author-
ity, that can be expected to reduce the size of government. I interpret this
as a consequence of vertical ﬁscal imbalance. Vertical ﬁscal imbalance is
typically bridged through intergovernmental transfers and consequently as-
sociated with soft budget constrains. Vertical ﬁscal imbalance also yields
incentives for local jurisdictions to push for high taxes at the central level,
which in turn yields expenditures with regionally concentrated beneﬁts. Both
mechanisms introduce the possibility for subcentral governments to impose
their costs on residents outside the jurisdiction. Generally, vertical ﬁscal
imbalance is associated with less accountability and with bureaucrats and
politicians who have weaker incentives to care about the ﬁnancial conse-
quences of ﬁscal competition and poor provision of public services. Thus,
15 Rodden (2004) speculates that the negative effect of a dummy for federal countries on
government spending might have to do with the status quo bias among federations due to
multiple veto players in the era of welfare-state expansion.
16 The following countries were coded as federations: Australia, Austria, Belgium (since
1993), Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.
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consistent with Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) collusion argument, it is not
surprising that expenditure decentralization, for given extent of tax revenue
decentralization, is associated with a larger public sector. However, alterna-
tive mechanismsmay give similar results. Voters may simply demand a larger
public sector if there is less waste when the production of public services is
decentralized.
The asymmetric effect of the two measures of decentralization is con-
sistent with the central ﬁndings of recent studies that take the distinction
between different types of decentralization seriously, notably Jin and Zou
(2002), Rodden (2003), and Stein (1999). These studies suggest that vertical
ﬁscal imbalance is an important determinant of the size of the public sec-
tor. Jin and Zou (2002) utilize panel data from developed and developing
countries from the GFS. They estimate models where expenditure decen-
tralization and tax revenue decentralization enter separately and ﬁnd that
expenditure decentralization increases the aggregate size of government,
while tax revenue decentralization restricts it. Jin and Zou also ﬁnd that
a measure of vertical ﬁscal imbalance (the percentage of subcentral govern-
ment expenditure that is ﬁnanced with grants) is positively associated with
public-sector size. Utilizing a similar panel data set, Rodden (2003) also ﬁnds
that governments tend to grow faster when subcentral governments aremore
dependent on grants.17 Finally, Stein (1999), employing cross-country data
from Latin America, ﬁnds that countries with larger vertical ﬁscal imbalance
tend to have larger governments.
A ﬁrst attempt at explaining how different parts of the public sector are
affected by ﬁscal decentralization is presented in speciﬁcations (3) to (6) in
table 2. Interestingly, it seems like transfers and government consumption
are differently affected by ﬁscal decentralization. Social security transfers
decrease in tax revenue decentralization, while no statistical signiﬁcant ef-
fect is found for expenditure decentralization. Government consumption
portrays a different picture: Tax revenue decentralization is not important,
while expenditure decentralization increases government consumption. This
suggests that the asymmetric effect of the twomeasures of ﬁscal decentraliza-
tion on overall government spending can be traced back to differing effects
on components of the government spending.
The cross-country estimations suggests that an increase in tax revenue
decentralization by 1 standard deviation (17 percentage points) decreases
total government expenditures and transfers by around 2 percentage points
of GDP. This corresponds to 0.2 and 0.4 standard deviation in total gov-
17 In an extension, Rodden utilizes information from the OECD (1999) analysis to dis-
tinguish between subcentral governments’ ability to set the tax rate and tax base au-
tonomously. His cross-country estimations suggest a negative relationship between tax
revenue decentralization and public-sector size.
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ernment expenditures and transfers, respectively. A 1-standard-deviation
increase in expenditure decentralization (13 percentage points) increases
total government expenditures and government consumption by around 3
and 2 percentage points, respectively.
Previous research has found a negative relationship between a simple
dummy for federalism and welfare spending. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in
table 2. Federal countries seem to spend less on both transfers and govern-
ment consumption. It is interesting to note that the effects of the decentral-
ization indicators and the federation dummy seem to be quite independent
of each other. The effects of tax revenue decentralization and expenditure
decentralization are basically unaltered if Federation is excluded from the
regressions, although the statistical signiﬁcance decreases somewhat for total
government spending and government consumption.18
Cross-country evidencehas anumberof shortcomings.Asdiscussedabove,
it may be problematic to base inference on variation between countries if
cross-sectionheterogeneity is large. If there are some inherent features of dif-
ferent countries that affect government spending and that are not accurately
captured by any of the included regressors, then the correct approach is to
include a full set of country dummies. Garrett and Mitchell (2001) criticize
the standard approach in welfare-state research and argue that leaving out
country FE is likely to lead to substantial bias in the results. In the following
I report different speciﬁcations that take into account country FE. These are
reported in table 3.
The main results from the OLS analysis are reproduced when country-
speciﬁc FE are controlled for. Tax revenue decentralization is associated
with less transfers (but now only statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level),
and expenditure decentralization is associated with increased government
consumption.There is evidence (on the 10%level of signiﬁcance) that overall
government spending increases with increasing decentralization of spending
powers.
Inference in the FE estimations is based on countries that have altered
their vertical government structure over time. This means that decentraliza-
tion trends observed in particular for Belgium, France, and Spain contribute
considerably to identifying the effect of tax revenue decentralization on gov-
ernment spending. But also other countries that have changed their vertical
government structure between 1970 and 2000 contribute to identifying the
main coefﬁcients of interest.
Among the countries in the sample, the traditional federal countries stand
out. They have had very stable vertical government structures in the period
that I study. Consequently one may argue that they should not be included
18 The raw correlation between TaxRevDec (ExpDec) and Federation is 0.34 (0.47).
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in the FE estimation, where inference is based purely on within-country
variation. An argument for doing so nonetheless is that they help to iden-
tify other effects and consequently yield more precise estimates also of the
decentralization variables. As a robustness check I analyze how my results
are affected by excluding the traditional federal countries. This is reported
in table 4. I ﬁnd that the main results are conﬁrmed when the countries
with the least variation in the central independent variables are excluded.
Expenditure decentralization is associated with increased government con-
sumption and a larger public sector. But no statistically signiﬁcant effect of
tax revenue decentralization on social security transfers can be found in this
sample.
The control variables reported in table 3 show more or less the expected
pattern. The macroeconomic variables – unemployment, income, and eco-
nomic growth – are important. Increases in unemployment and in the share
of people over 65 are associated with a larger public sector, and in particu-
lar transfer spending. Unemployment and Over 65 capture both automatic
entitlement pressures and political demands. Economic growth is negatively
associated with public-sector size which, suggests a countercyclical pattern.
Relying on within-country variation, no support for Wagner’s law, which
states that the demand for government services is income-elastic, is found.
In fact, GDP per capita enters with a negative sign in speciﬁcation (8), which
is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Rural population is negatively associated with
government consumption and positively associated with transfer spending,
both associations being statistically signiﬁcant.19
On theoretical grounds it is not clear how increased integration into the
world economy should affect welfare spending. On the one hand, economic
integration is likely to create competition for cross-country mobile factors in
a similar fashion to interjurisdictional competition within a country. Hans-
Werner Sinn, among others, has been concerned about this development in
the European welfare states (see for example Sinn, 2003). However, it can
also be argued that government spending is expected to increase if govern-
ments expand the welfare state to provide a cushion against external risks
(Rodrik, 1997, 1998). Relying on cross-country inference, a positive relation-
ship is observed, and the effect on total government spending is driven by
increases in transfers, which seems reasonable if government expenditures
play a risk-mitigating role (Rodrik, 1998). When country FE are included,
such a positive relationship is no longer observed. In fact, openness seems to
depress government consumption according to speciﬁcations (11) and (12).
Finally, there is some evidence based on cross-country regressions that left
19 Settlement pattern is a standard control variable in studies focusing on the size of govern-
ment and was also included in Oates’s seminal study (Oates, 1985). It is not clear how the
effect of settlement pattern should be interpreted.
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and center governments are associated with a larger public sector, but this
effect also vanishes if country FE are included.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
One of the most interesting ﬁndings in the current analysis is that ﬁscal
decentralization seems to be associated with less transfer spending and po-
tentially less generous welfare states. To investigate how robust this result
is, I carry out two sensitivity analyses concerning the applied measure of
welfare generosity (Transfers), before I move on (in section 7) to discussing
how the results should be interpreted. First, I evaluate whether the negative
effect of ﬁscal decentralization on transfer spending holds when old-age pen-
sions, which hardly can be decentralized to the regional level, are excluded.
Second, I apply net replacement rates as an alternative proxy for welfare
generosity.
6.1. Nonpension Social Security Expenditures
An important component of Transfers is old age pensions, which hardly can
be decentralized to the regional level. Studying the effect of decentraliza-
tion on transfer spending, there is a rationale for excluding old age pensions.
Since there exists no data going back to the 1970swithinwhich one can distin-
guish between different forms of transfer spending, this has not been done
in the above presented analysis. However, in the OECD’s social expendi-
ture database it is possible to distinguish between different forms of transfer
spending from 1980 onwards.20 A potentially problematic aspect with this
data is that it also includes mandatory private social security expenditures.
Keeping this and the reduced time variation inmind, it can nonetheless be in-
teresting to evaluate whether the association between ﬁscal decentralization
and transfer spending holds with this alternative measure.
Additional regressions are run where I replace the measure Transfers,
documented above, with OECD’s aggregate social expenditure measure ex-
cluding old age, disability, and survivor beneﬁts. Those beneﬁts constitute
on average close to half of total social expenditures. Regressions with non-
pension social expenditures as dependent variable are reported in table 5.
A somewhat puzzling positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect of expendi-
ture decentralization is found, relying on pooled OLS estimates. This coef-
ﬁcient ﬂips around in the more reliable FE estimates, suggesting a negative
20 The Social Expenditure Database distinguishes between old age, survivors, and
incapacity-related beneﬁts, health, family, active labor-market programs, unemploy-
ment, housing, and other social policy areas.
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Table 5
Fiscal Decentralization and Nonpension Social Security Expenditures, Ordi-
nary Least Squares and Fixed Effects Estimates
Social Expenditures Excluding Old Age, Disability, and Survivors Beneﬁts
(19) (20) (21) (22)
Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error Coeff. St. error
TaxRevDec 0.005 0.027 −0.006 0.026 0.043 0.062 0.034 0.063
ExpDec 0.103∗∗ 0.039 −0.245∗ 0.130
Federation −3.427∗∗∗ 0.675 −4.143∗∗∗ 0.666
Unemployment 0.278∗∗∗ 0.091 0.270∗∗∗ 0.084 0.244∗∗ 0.107 0.234∗ 0.118
GDP_ 95us 0.883 0.602 0.599 0.640 −1.266 1.256 2.456 1.948
Growth −0.179 0.255 −0.470∗ 0.260 −0.076 0.184 −0.116 0.199
Openness 0.017 0.015 0.041∗∗ 0.016 −0.021 0.038 −0.067 0.046
Population −0.038∗ 0.020 0.006 0.022 −0.043 0.378 −0.155 0.417
(Population)2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
Rural population −0.110∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.071∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.186∗ 0.096 −0.147 0.142
Under 15 −0.107 0.186 −0.093 0.170 −0.205 0.283 −0.570 0.380
Over 65 0.088 0.243 0.097 0.239 −0.253 0.464 0.495 0.569
Left 0.014 0.010 0.016∗ 0.009 −0.004 0.007 −0.001 0.007
Center 0.032∗∗ 0.013 0.022∗ 0.012 −0.004 0.013 −0.002 0.013
R2adj 0.649 0.767 0.912 0.902
Country ﬁxed No No Yes Yeseffects
Number of 18 17 18 17countries
Number of 69 63 69 63observations
Note: A constant term is included in all speciﬁcations (not reported). The asterisks ∗∗∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
effect of expenditure decentralization and no effect of tax revenue decentral-
ization. The same pattern is found when I utilize the aggregate measure of
social expenditures (including all beneﬁts).21 This is quite different from the
results presented in table 3, where I found a negative effect of tax revenue
decentralization and no effect of expenditure decentralization. Relying on
Transfers as deﬁned in section 5, conﬁning the sample to the period after
1980, and reanalyzing models (9) and (10), I ﬁnd similar (but not statistically
signiﬁcant) results to those in table 3 (not reported). Although the reduced
time variation makes it harder to obtain the “true” effect of ﬁscal decentral-
ization on transfer spending, these regressions provide suggestive evidence
that the negative effect of decentralization of taxing powers is partially due
to reduced pension spending. All estimates based on FE estimations suggest
21 This measure is similar, but not identical, to Transfers. The raw correlation between these
two measures ranges from around 0.8 to 0.9 for different years.
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that there is a negative association between ﬁscal decentralization and trans-
fer spending, but which aspect of ﬁscal decentralization matters depends on
the dependent variable chosen.
6.2. An Alternative Measure of Welfare Generosity
To isolate the effect of decentralization on redistribution it would be use-
ful to have some measure of the welfare entitlements of a standardized
household across countries. This is the strategy followed by Fiva and Rattsø
(2006), studying welfare competition among Norwegian local governments.
An equivalent reliablemeasure suitable for cross-country evaluations is hard
to obtain. As an approximation I introduce beneﬁt replacement rates as an
alternativemeasure of welfare generosity. If ﬁscal decentralization is actually
associated with less generous welfare states, then this alternative measure
should produce similar results to the above.
Since my emphasis is on redistributive spending that can readily be de-
centralized, I evaluate the OECD’s measure of net replacement rates for
long-term beneﬁt recipients. These replacement rates show the proportion
of in-work income that is maintained for somebody unemployed for the
60th month, net of taxes. The measure includes unemployment insurance
and related welfare beneﬁts (e.g., social assistance, family beneﬁts, housing
beneﬁts, employment-conditional beneﬁts, and lone-parent beneﬁts).22
The replacement rates are calculated as an unweighted average of four
different household groups and two alternative earnings possibilities. This
measure is close to (unconditionally) unrelated to the measure of ﬁscal de-
centralization and varies from 28% in the U.S. to around 75% for Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The raw correlations with transfers and with nonpension social expenditures
are 0.45 and 0.55, respectively. Clearly, since redistributive spending varies
within decentralized countries, the OECD measure of replacement rates
must be interpreted as a national average.
To my knowledge there is no reliable longer time series available for
net replacement rates across countries for long-term unemployed. Thus, this
leavesmewith a cross section of 18 observations for 2001. In table 6 I present
results where the most reliable measure of ﬁscal decentralization is related
to the net replacement rate, utilizing the same controls as in the previous
analysis. Interestingly, countries that have more decentralized responsibility
for ﬁnancing of the public sector have lower replacement rates, but the effect
is statistically insigniﬁcant. With only 18 observations, however, it is hard
to test the effect of several different variables. Consequently I exclude one
22 The data is collected from OECD (2004), table 3.2a.
123
Fiscal Decentralization and Government Spending 273
Ta
b
le
6
F
is
ca
lD
ec
en
tr
al
iz
at
io
n
an
d
N
et
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
tR
at
es
,O
rd
in
ar
y
L
ea
st
Sq
ua
re
s
E
st
im
at
es
N
et
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
R
at
es
A
ft
er
60
M
on
th
s
of
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
(2
3)
(2
4)
(2
5)
(2
6)
(2
7)
C
oe
ff
.
St
.e
rr
or
C
oe
ff
.
St
.e
rr
or
C
oe
ff
.
St
.e
rr
or
C
oe
ff
.
St
.e
rr
or
C
oe
ff
.
St
.e
rr
or
T
ax
R
ev
D
ec
−0
.2
00
0.
16
0
−0
.2
68
∗∗
0.
10
7
−0
.2
63
∗∗
0.
10
6
−0
.3
57
∗∗
∗
0.
13
8
E
xp
D
ec
0.
23
3
0.
20
4
−0
.0
94
0.
19
6
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
0.
15
7
7.
42
4
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
66
6
0.
95
4
0.
81
2
0.
59
0
G
D
P_
95
us
12
.9
37
∗∗
∗
3.
91
8
13
.9
84
∗∗
∗
2.
73
7
11
.3
92
∗∗
∗
2.
01
2
10
.3
62
∗∗
∗
2.
36
7
9.
36
6∗
∗∗
2.
83
9
G
ro
w
th
0.
87
4
3.
75
3
O
pe
nn
es
s
0.
05
1
0.
10
9
P
op
ul
at
io
n
−0
.0
65
0.
04
8
−0
.0
92
∗∗
∗
0.
02
7
−0
.1
10
∗∗
∗
0.
02
5
−0
.1
15
∗∗
∗
0.
02
7
−0
.1
14
∗∗
∗
0.
03
3
R
ur
al
po
pu
la
tio
n
−0
.0
88
0.
27
6
U
nd
er
15
−2
.8
66
2.
76
6
−1
.8
60
1.
37
3
O
ve
r
65
−3
.8
20
3.
15
7
−3
.9
18
2.
31
6
L
ef
t
0.
20
8
0.
15
0
0.
23
2∗
∗
0.
09
3
0.
10
2∗
0.
05
5
0.
14
6∗
0.
06
7
0.
11
3
0.
08
0
C
en
te
r
−0
.0
57
0.
10
1
R
2 ad
j
0.
65
5
0.
79
4
0.
78
8
0.
79
0
0.
69
0
N
um
be
r
of
co
un
tr
ie
s
18
18
18
17
17
N
um
be
r
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
18
18
18
17
17
N
ot
e:
A
co
ns
ta
nt
te
rm
is
in
cl
ud
ed
in
al
l
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
ti
on
s
(n
ot
re
po
rt
ed
).
T
he
as
te
ri
sk
s
∗∗
∗ ,
∗∗
,a
nd
∗
de
no
te
si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
,5
%
,a
nd
10
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.T
he
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
us
ed
ar
e
ba
se
d
on
a
5-
ye
ar
av
er
ag
e
fo
r
th
e
pe
ri
od
19
96
–2
00
0.
124
Jon H. Fiva274
variable at a time until I am left with variables that are (close to) statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 20% level, presented in speciﬁcation (24), and at the
10% level, presented in speciﬁcation (25). These more parsimonious spe-
ciﬁcations show a statistically signiﬁcant negative association between tax
revenue decentralization and net replacement rates. Speciﬁcations (26) and
(27), where I include both measures of ﬁscal decentralization and only ex-
penditure decentralization, respectively, show the same pattern: a negative
association with decentralization of taxing powers, and no association with
decentralization of expenditures.
7.Discussion
The Leviathan theory, elaborated by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), argues
that greater centralization can be harmful, because it reduces voters’ ﬁscal
location choices, thereby increasing government’s monopoly power. With
less competition, the government is able to exploit its citizenry more fully
and increases the size of the public sector. Following this line of reasoning,
it is reasonable to expect a downward pressure on government size from
decentralization of taxing powers (for given extent of decentralization of
spending powers). Decentralization of spending powers (for given extent of
decentralization of taxing powers) is likely to increase the size of govern-
ment, because this reduces interjurisdictional competition. The regressions
related to government size using both measures of ﬁscal decentralization –
speciﬁcations (2), (8), and (14) in tables 2–4 – are consistent with this hy-
pothesis, although no effect of tax revenue decentralization can be found in
the FE estimations. Closer investigation of the composition of government
spending suggests that this pattern is driven by decreased transfer spending
due to decentralization of taxing powers and by increased government con-
sumption due to increaseddecentralization of spending powers.Whether the
reduction in transfer is caused by a decrease in nonpension or in pension ex-
penditures, this is suggestiveevidence that ﬁscal decentralizationdoes not act
as a powerful instrument to prevent policymakers from wasting resources.
Since transfer spending is negatively related to ﬁscal decentralization,
a possible mechanism discussed by Stigler (1957) and others may be more
important than restricting Leviathan. Stigler stressed that decentralized re-
sponsibility for redistribution yields incentives for subcentral levels of gov-
ernment to behave strategically in determining taxation and spending levels
to inﬂuence the location of households.23 In its extreme version this phe-
23 It may also be that mobility of ﬁrms provides incentives for subcentral governments to
strategically reduce transfer spending (and increase infrastructure, say) (Keen and Mar-
chand, 1996).
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nomenon is known as the race to the bottom in taxation and welfare spend-
ing. Since social security transfers as a share of GDP are an imperfect proxy
for redistributive spending, it is comforting that the alternative measure of
welfare generosity, presented in section 6.2, yields the same picture.
8. Conclusion
Alarge empirical literature has looked for evidence of downwardpressureon
taxes and expenditures from decentralization of ﬁscal powers. Until recently
most cross-country studies have ignored the distinction between taxes the
subcentral government can alter autonomously and taxes it does not have
full discretion upon. This paper adds to the empirical literature by utilizing
improved data on tax revenue decentralization to reexamine the relationship
between ﬁscal decentralization and the size of government. An important
lesson from this paper is that whether revenue generation and expenditures,
or just expenditures, are decentralized matters for both the size and the
composition of the public sector. Vertical ﬁscal imbalance, in the sense of
more expenditure decentralization for given tax revenue decentralization,
is associated with a larger public sector. This effect seems to be driven by
increased public consumption. Tax revenue decentralization is on the other
hand associated with a smaller public sector, primarily due to less spending
on social security transfers. Since transfer spending may work as a proxy for
redistributive spending, the results indicate, in line with theory, that ﬁscal
decentralization yields less generous welfare states. Utilizing an alternative
measure of welfare generosity, I ﬁnd the same pattern.
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